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AIDING AVARICE: THE INEQUITABLE
RESULTS OF LIMITED GROUNDS FOR
SPOUSAL DISQUALIFICATION UNDER
EPTL § 5-1.2
JESSICA BAQUET
INTRODUCTION
For thousands of years, it has been settled in law that a person
is not completely free to dictate how his property will be disposed
of after his death.1 The most significant historic limitation on
' J.D., St. John's University School of Law, June 2008; B.A. Politics and Philosophy,
New York University, May 2005. I thank my parents, siblings and husband for their un-
conditional support, and Professor Margaret Valentine Turano for her guidance.
1 See Encyc. Britannica, Inheritance, available at http://www.britannica.comleb/article-
13094/inheritance (last visited Mar. 23, 2008) ("Freedom of testation has never been abso-
lutely unlimited."); see also Melanie B. Leslie, The Myth of Testamentary Freedom, 38
ARIz. L. REv. 235, 235 (1996) (asserting that, even though some say "the first principle of
the law of wills is freedom of testation,"' the formality of most wills statutes seriously lim-
its testamentary freedom); see also Terry L. Turnipseed, Why Shouldn't I Be Allowed to
Leave My Property to Whomever I Choose At My Death? (Or How I Learned to Stop Worry-
ing and Start Loving the French), 44 BRANDEIS L.J. 737, 742 (2006) (noting that
"[1]imitations upon free testation are at least as old as the Code of Hammurabi," written
in 2084 B.C.); see also Kymberleigh N. Korpus, Note, Extinguishing Inheritance Rights:
California Breaks New Ground in the Fight Against Elder Abuse but Fails to Build an Ef-
fective Foundation, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 537, 559 (2001) (explaining that, prior to the Statute
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"free testation" is that one spouse cannot disinherit the other.2
This legal concept still pervades the law. Today, almost all of the
fifty states have legislation that provides a surviving spouse with
the right to inherit a percentage of a deceased spouse's estate,
even if the deceased spouse attempted to disinherit the surviving
spouse in his will.3 Why does the law prohibit one spouse from
disinheriting the other? Historically, the reason was to protect a
wife from poverty in the event that her husband met his death. 4
Today, the law recognizes that marriage is a partnership that
depends upon the contribution of both spouses and, as such, each
spouse is entitled to a share of what belongs to the other.6
However, some state laws governing spousal disinheritance are
outdated and out-of-step with today's social climate. There may
be no better example of this than the New York laws governing
of Wills in 1540, inheritance under English Common Law was "a system of forced heir-
ship").
2 See THIRD REPORT OF THE TEMPORARY STATE COMM'N ON THE MODERNIZATION,
REVISION & SIMPLIFICATION OF THE LAW OF ESTATES, Legis. Doc. No. 19, at 202 (1964)
[hereinafter THIRD REPORT] (explaining that, historically, dower and curtesy were the on-
ly bar to complete testamentary freedom in New York); see also Turnipseed, supra note 1,
at 744-45 (providing history that explains why some form of protection preventing hus-
bands from disinheriting their wives was required at common law in order to counterbal-
ance the extreme subordination of wives at that time).
3 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 901 (2008) (stating that the surviving spouse is entitled
to one-third share of the decedent's estate less any transfers to the surviving spouse); see
also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:8-1 (2007) (providing that the surviving spouse is entitled to
one-third of the decedent's "augmented estate"); see also S.C. CODE. ANN. § 62-2-201 (2007)
(entitling the surviving spouse to one-third of the decedent's estate); see also W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 42-3-1 (2007) (permitting the surviving spouse to "a right of election" in the dece-
dent's estate determined by the length of the marriage); see also Turnipseed, supra note 1,
at 739, 771 (asserting that virtually every state in the union has either an elective share
statute, dower and curtesy laws or a community property approach limiting free testation,
except for Georgia, which provides the spouse with the "unfettered ability" to disinherit
his mate).
4 See WARREN'S WEED NEW YORK REAL PROPERTY § 1.05 (4th ed. 1999) [hereinafter
WARREN'S WEED] (positing that a wife's dower interest is designed to "guarantee susten-
ance for herself, and nurture and education for her children, should her husband prede-
cease her").
5 See First Report of the EPTL-SCPA Advisory Committee, in 13-1 WARREN'S HEATON
ON SURROGATE'S COURT PRACTICE app. 1.04[2] (2007) [hereinafter First Report of the Ad-
visory Committee] (noting that a major trend that has recently emerged is the "increasing
legal recognition of the theory that marriage is an economic partnership"); see also Leslie
Fields, Alabama's Elective Share: It's Time to Adopt a Partnership Theory of Marriage, 46
ALA. L. REV. 797, 798 (1995) (providing that modern scholars prefer the community prop-
erty regime, as under it, property earned during the marriage does not become the fruit of
the earner, but rather becomes property of the marriage, thus providing both spouses
with ownership over the property).
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the disqualification of a surviving spouse. 6 When a surviving
spouse is "disqualified" in New York, she can no longer elect
against the deceased spouse's will,7 inherit from the deceased
spouse if he dies intestate,8 exercise her right to the "exemption
for the benefit of family,"9 or lay claim to the proceeds of a law-
suit brought for wrongful death of the deceased spouse.10 In keep-
ing with the historical trend of protecting the surviving spouse,
New York law provides limited circumstances in which a surviv-
ing spouse can be disqualified."1 In the simplest terms, a surviv-
ing spouse may be disqualified only where, at the date of the de-
ceased spouse's death: (1) a decree of divorce, separation,
annulment, or dissolution of marriage, recognized as valid in
New York, or valid in the issuing state but not in New York, was
in effect; (2) the surviving spouse abandoned the deceased
spouse; (3) the marriage was bigamous, incestuous or otherwise
prohibited; or (4) the surviving spouse had a duty to support the
decedent but failed to do so. 12
The limited provisions for spousal disqualification are inade-
quate because they do not account for various modern scenarios
in which the surviving spouse should not be entitled to protection
and in which the deceased spouse should be able to disinherit the
surviving spouse. For example, couples today sometimes perma-
nently end their marriages without legally divorcing. 13 In other
6 See generally N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-1.2 (McKinney 2008) (providing
the methods which a spouse in New York may disqualify a surviving spouse from any in-
heritance); see also First Report of the Advisory Committee, supra note 5, at 2 (describing
the overall trend with which the drafters of the EPTL considered that statute to be in ac-
cord).
7 See id. § 5-1.1 (setting forth the precepts of the right of election); see also id. § 5-1.1-A
(clarifying the provisions which govern the spousal right of election).
s See id. § 4-1.1 (discussing a spouse's right to inherit from his or her mate in intestacy);
see also id. § 2-1.8 (outlining the amounts excluded from intestacy).
9 Id. § 5-3.1. Under this exemption, where the decedent leaves a surviving spouse and/or
surviving children under age 21, certain property belonging to the decedent, such as cloth-
ing, photos and other personal items, vests in the surviving spouse or children and does
not pass through the decedent's estate. Id.
10 See id. § 5-4.4 (setting forth a spouse's right to the proceeds of a wrongful death law-
suit); see also id. § 5-4.3 (defining what damages are covered).
11 See id. § 5-1.2 (providing the methods which a spouse in New York may disqualify a
surviving spouse from any inheritance); see also Fields, supra note 5, at 798 (explaining
the modern trend that generally seeks to entitle both spouses to the earnings of the oth-
er).
12 See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
13 See In re Estate of Carmona, 223 N.Y.L.J. 92 (Sur. Ct. 2000) (discussing a surviving
spouse's ability to exercise his right of election against the decedent spouse's will, where
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situations, individuals marry for the limited purpose of enabling
a foreigner to become a U.S. citizen, and later lack the funds to
get divorced and/or the knowledge of the legal ramifications of
the failure to procure a divorce. 14 In addition, an alarming trend
has developed in the recent past in which deceitful caretakers
marry their elderly and incapacitated wards solely to financially
exploit them.15 In these circumstances, the unworthy spouse
cannot be disqualified under the statute's language. Therefore,
the bar to spousal disinheritance in New York sometimes pro-
tects unworthy individuals whose interests should not be safe-
guarded.
This note asserts that, in this area, New York law is in dire
need of reform. Part I will provide a brief history of the bar to
spousal disinheritance. Part II will examine instances in which
New York Surrogates were unable to disqualify unworthy spous-
es because of the narrow provisions of the New York Estates,
Powers and Trusts Law (hereinafter EPTL) § 5-1.2. Part II will
also discuss societal trends that will soon present additional in-
stances in which a literal application of EPTL § 5-1.2 will lead to
inequitable results. Part III will propose amendments to EPTL §
5-1.2 and will describe policy justifications for legislative change.
Finally, Part IV will suggest that, in the absence of legislative
change, Surrogates in New York should apply the principle of
the married couple had separated and lived apart with almost no communication for more
than fourteen years, but never formally divorced); see also In re Estate of Lamos, 313
N.Y.S.2d 781, 782 (Sur. Ct. 1970) (considering the rights of a surviving spouse who had
lived apart from and had no communication at all with the decedent spouse for fourteen
years although the couple had never legally divorced or separated).
14 See In re Estate of Dominguez, 2002 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1596, at *2-*4 (Sur. Ct. Nov.
18, 2002) (finding that EPTL § 5-1.2 would not permit disqualification of a surviving
spouse on the grounds that he married decedent spouse only in order to obtain a green
card and the two never lived together as a married couple); see also Ctrs. for Disease Con-
trol, Dep't of Health & Hum. Services, Cohabitation, marriage, Divorce and Remarriage in
the United States, 23 VITAL & HEALTH STAT. 23, 22 (2002), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/series/sr_23/sr23_022.pdf (positing that couples are less
likely to transition from separation to legal divorce in communities that are poverty-
stricken and have very low median family income and education).
15 See, e.g., In re Joseph S., 808 N.Y.S.2d 426, 428 (App. Div. 2006) (annulling the mar-
riage of an elderly man, who suffered from mental and physical illnesses, to a caretaker
half his age, whose motives were "highly suspicious"); In re A.S., No. 20493/062007, 2007
N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2693, at *2 (Sup. Ct. 2007) (granting an annulment of the marriage of
an 87-year-old woman to her 57-year-old chauffer on the grounds that she lacked capacity
to enter the marriage and he had acted fraudulently in marrying her in order to deplete
her bank accounts, occupy her real estate and bring his daughter to the United States
from Ecuador).
[Vol. 23:3
AIDING AVARICE
equitable estoppel to prevent unworthy spouses from exercising
their rights of election.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE BAR To SPOUSAL DISINHERITANCE
The notion that one spouse cannot disinherit another is based
on several considerations. First, the law has long recognized that
one spouse's commitment to the other does not end with death. 16
The legislative history to the ETPL states that:
[a]n elective right was created against the provisions of a
will and hence against the property passing under a will, so
that a spouse could not by will disinherit his or her mate and
was obliged, to that extent, to fulfill the obligations of sup-
port required under the public policy of the state of New
York. 17
Second, marital relationships are reciprocal. Though man has
historically been thought of as the financial provider, in fact, he
can only play this role because his wife assists and supports in
making their home. And, today, these roles are often reversed.
For the unique contribution of support that each spouse makes to
the other, lawmakers have reasoned that a spouse is legally en-
titled to share in his or her mate's estate.'8 Finally, in situations
where one spouse is employed and the other is a homemaker, the
homemaker spouse would be unable to survive if the employed
spouse died leaving a will that disinherited him or her. Law-
makers consequently barred spousal disinheritance to protect the
surviving spousal from poverty.19
16 See THIRD REPORT, supra note 2, at 23 (explaining that the public policy of New York
requires posthumous spousal support); see also Fields, supra note 5, at 801 (positing that
the purpose of the elective share is to provide support for the surviving spouse because
"the obligation to support one's spouse continues beyond death").
17 THIRD REPORT, supra note 2, at 23.
18 See Fields, supra note 5, at 801 (noting that "[e]lective share statutes attempt to re-
turn to the surviving spouse [their] contribution to the marriage"); see also Sidney Kwes-
tel & Rena C. Seplowitz, Testamentary Substitutes: Retained Interests, Custodial Accounts
and Contractual Transactions - A New Approach, 38 AM. U.L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1988) (stating
that most laws have enacted some degree of legal protection for surviving spouses to com-
pensate them for their contribution to the marriage).
19 See THIRD REPORT, supra note 2, at 23 (detailing the policy reasoning behind New
York elective share statute); see also Bradley B. Wrightsel, A Proposed Solution to Spous-
al Disinheritance in Ohio: The Uniform Probate Code's Elective Share Revision, 19 OHIO
N.U.L. REV. 951, 953 (1993) (explaining that the policy behind elective share statutes is to
protect the surviving spouse from being disinherited and impoverished).
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While the bar to spousal disinheritance is well founded in
theory, it is also deeply rooted in law. In the United States, this
principle was first embodied by the common law concepts of dow-
er and curtesy,20 the origins of which date back to ancient
times. 21 An examination of modern laws illustrates that today's
legal principles are based on those common law concepts. For
example, a spouse's elective share today, in many states, is
equivalent to one-third of the decedent's estate.22 The concept of a
one-third fractional share dates at least as far back as the Magna
Carta of 1225, which provided that "'there shall be assigned to
[the widow] for her dower a third of all her husband's land which
was his in his lifetime, unless a smaller share was given her at
the church door."' 23
Dower was designed to protect women, the perceived weaker
sex, from 'imposition, to provide a fund for their maintenance,
when they can no longer lean on the protecting arm which had
sustained and supported them."'24 In essence, dower entitled a
widow to a life estate in one-third of the real property owned by
her husband during the marriage, no matter what his last will
and testament may have otherwise stated. 25 Even where a hus-
band attempted to transfer title to his land during his life, at
20 See Mark Patton, Note, Quasi-Community Property in Arizona: Why Just at Divorce
and Not Death?, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 167, 175 (2005) (stating that dower and curtesy were the
common law methods of preventing spousal disinheritance). See generally THIRD REPORT,
supra note 2, at 23 (describing the legislative history behind New York's dower and curte-
sy law).
21 See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
22 See Wrightsel, supra note 19, at 951 n.1 (stating that "[t]he statutory amount is typi-
cally one-third or one-half of the decedent's probate estate"); see also supra note 3 and ac-
companying text.
23 Thomas Lund, Some Interesting Medieval Dower Cases, 37 U. TOL. L. REV. 659, 743
(2006) (quoting Magna Carta, reprinted in 3 ENGLISH HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS (1189-
1327) 342 (1975)).
24 Kevin R. Garrison, The Ins and Outs of the Alabama Elective Share, 58 ALA. L. REV.
1161, 1162 (2007) (quoting Gould v. Womack, 2 Ala. 83, 94 (1841)).
25 See FOURTH REPORT OF THE TEMPORARY STATE COMM'N ON THE MODERNIZATION,
REVISION AND SIMPLIFICATION OF THE LAW OF ESTATES, Legis. Doc. No. 19, at 276 (1965)
[hereinafter FOURTH REPORT] (noting that the New York dower statute entitled a widow
to one-third of the lands owned by her husband during their marriage); see also Lund, su-
pra note 23, at 660 (stating that the basic dower rule was that a widow was entitled to
one-third of the land owned by her husband during his life); see also Theresa M. Mohan &
J. Aaron J. Byrd, You Cannot Change 500 Years of Property Law at 5p.m. on a Friday:
Dower as Applied in Kentucky, 33 N. KY. L. REV. 335, 336 (2006) (explaining that at com-
mon law, a widow was entitled to a one-third life estate in any land that her husband
owned in fee simple or fee tail during the marriage).
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common law the transferee took title subject to the widow's dow-
er interest, which would entitle her to reclaim one-third of the
land after her husband's death.26
Curtesy, on the other hand, was designed to provide for a sur-
viving husband after his wife's death by entitling him "to a life
estate in the land that his wife owned during their marriage, as-
suming that a child was born alive to the couple."27 Provisions
governing curtesy made no mention of a one-third share, and
traditionally entitled a widower to a life estate in all of the prop-
erty his wife owned during the marriage.28 This was more than
the one-third share that dower provided a widow.29 However,
while a wife could exercise her right to dower irrespective of
whether she bore the children of her husband, a husband was en-
titled to curtesy only where his wife had birthed his issue. 30
Though the concept of dower once seemed to provide significant
protection for a widow, changing times have rendered it largely
ineffective. Dower entitled a widow only to a life estate in one-
third of the real property owned by her husband, but not to any of
his intangible assets.31 At a time when most families made their
26 See Lund, supra note 23, at 660-61 (positing that a person who buys land from a
married man takes an interest in the land subject to the wife's dower interest); see also
Turnipseed, supra note 1, at 738 (asserting that once dower was attached to land at the
inception marriage, a husband could not unilaterally terminate the dower by transferring
the land).
27 Garrison, supra note 24, at 1163 (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 411 (8th ed.
2004)); see In re Estate of Starbuck, 116 N.Y.S. 1030, 1031-32 (Sur. Ct. 1909) (quoting
Burrill's Law Dictionary which said that curtesy is "[a]n estate to which a man is by law
entitled, on the death of his wife, in the lands or tenements of which she was seized dur-
ing the marriage in fee simple or fee tail, provided he had issue by her, born alive, during
the marriage, and capable of inheriting her estate").
28 See Garrison, supra note 24, at 1163 (noting absence of the "fractional share" for the
concept of curtesy); see also Patton, supra note 20 ,at 176 (stating that curtesy provided
the husband with a life estate in an entire parcel of land and not merely one-third of it).
29 See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
30 See, e.g., In re Estate of Starbuck, 116 N.Y.S. at 1031-32 (quoting Burrill's Law Dic-
tionary which defined curtesy as "[aln estate to which a man is by law entitled, on the
death of his wife, in the lands or tenements of which she was seized during the marriage
in fee simple or fee tail, provided he had issue by her, born alive, during the marriage,
and capable of inheriting her estate"); see also Garrision, supra note 24, at 1163 (clarify-
ing that curtesy was dependent on a child being born alive to the couple).
31 See Fields, supra note 5, at 800 (stating that dower entitled a widow to a life estate in
one-third of her husband's real property, but not in any "modern" assets); see also Mona-
han & Byrd, supra note 25, at 336, (explaining how common law inheritance principles
entitled one spouse only to an interest in the other spouses' real property).
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living by farming their land, this system made sense.32 However,
as a result of the industrial revolution, wealth came to be more
commonly possessed in intangible forms, like securities. 33 Dower,
therefore, ultimately came to provide the widow with less finan-
cial security after her husband's death. For this reason, most
states in the U.S. abolished dower in the early 1900s. 34
New York was among the first states to abandon the dower
and curtesy system. 35 Reportedly, New York did so at the recom-
mendation of the Decedent Estate Commission 36 after two in-
stances in which one spouse managed to disinherit the other. 37
The Decedent Estate Commission characterized dower as "a po-
lite phrase without any substantial benefit to [a wife]."38, The De-
cedent Estate Law abolished dower except as to marriages that
occurred prior to September 1, 1930 in which the husband was
seized of an estate of inheritance prior to that date and during
the marriage. 39 Curtsey, on the other hand, was abolished except
32 See Fields, supra note 5, at 800 (discussing the fact that during the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries, society was agrarian and most people didn't have trust funds, in-
surance policies or securities); see also Reginald F. Byron, United Kingdom: Countries and
Their Culture, BNET: COUNTRIES & THEIR CULTURE, Jan. 1, 2001, http://findarticles.com/
p/articles/mi-gx5228/is_2001/ai_nl1944273/pg_3 (stating that "the Industrial Revolution
created a new social order as entrepreneurship and factory production resulted in new
forms of wealth and work that were added to the agrarian social order").
33 See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
34 See Fields, supra note 5, at 801 (noting that the transformation in the U.S. economy
led to the abolition of the dower and curtesy system); see also Turnipseed, supra note 1, at
748 (recording that New York was the first state to do away with dower and curtesy).
35 See THIRD REPORT, supra note 2 at 23 ("Prior to 1930, New York law provided for
common law rights of dower and curtsey. These were virtually abolished upon recommen-
dation of the Foley Commission."); see also Turnipseed, supra note 1, at 748 (stating that
New York's elective share statute was the first of its kind in the United States).
36 See THIRD REPORT, supra note 2, at 191 (noting that the right of election was created
at the recommendation of the Decedent Estate Commission); see also supra note 35 and
accompanying text.
37 Turnipseed, supra note 1, at 748 (asserting that legislators in New York abolished
dower and curtsey "based solely on anecdotal evidence of two instances of disinheritance;
no disinheritance studies had been conducted at that time"). See generally Ariela R. Dub-
ler, In the Shadow of Marriage: Single Women and the Legal Construction of the Family
and the State, 112 YALE L.J. 1641, 1672 (2003) (discussing the 'Fearon Bill' which ab-
olished dower and curtesy in New York).
38 THIRD REPORT, supra note 2, at 202-03.
39 See 40 N.Y. JUR. 2D § 955 (2008) (providing that "while dower is of diminishing im-
portance, it still exists where the parties were married before September 1, 1930"); see
also Former N.Y. DEC. EST. LAW § 18 (1930) (limiting a spouse's right of dower and curtsey
for marriages and deaths prior to 1930).
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as to those wives dying prior to August 31, 1930. 40
The system of dower and curtsey was replaced by the elective
share, a right belonging to husband and wife alike,41 which was
first provided for in the Decedent Estate Law. 42 The elective
share was thought to be "the greatest reform in the law of prop-
erty in New York State in one hundred years."43 The purpose of
the law was to correct "the glaring inconsistency in [New York]
law which compels a man to support his wife during his lifetime
and permits him to leave her practically penniless at his death."44
In short, if the deceased spouse left to his mate less than the
amount she stood to gain by exercising her right of election, the
surviving spouse could simply elect against the will, which would
entitle her to one-third of the deceased spouse's estate. 45 Howev-
er, section 18 of the Decedent Estate Law "permitted a surviving
spouse to elect to take a specific share of the estate of [the de-
ceased spouse], but the share ... was limited to assets which
passed under the decedent's will."46 Accordingly, non-probate as-
sets were not within a spouse's reach through the exercise of his
or her right of election.
It soon became clear that the Decedent Estate Law did not
adequately protect a surviving spouse, because it "failed to cover
inter vivos transfers made by the decedent or various situations
where title passes by operation of law on death of the settlor."47
40 See supra note 39. Curtsey was abolished by Former N.Y. Dec. Est. Law § 18 (1930)
except for deaths preceding this date. See generally George L. Haskins, Curtesy in the
United States, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 196, 196-200 (1951). In his article, Haskins provides a
discussion on the general characteristics of curtesy. Id.
41 See THIRD REPORT, supra note 2, at 197 (explaining that there wasn't "any distinction
made on account of the sex of the surviving spouse"); see also Richard A. Whitney, Legal
Rights that are Lost by a Divorcing Spouse - New York Law, LAWYERS.COM,
http://www.lawyers.com/rawhitney/RightsLostAsAResultofDivorce.jsp (last visited Aug.
10, 2008) (discussing the right of election in the context of divorce).
42 See THIRD REPORT, supra note 2, at 214 (describing the Decedent Estate Law); see al-
so Ariela R. Dubler, In the Shadow of Marriage: Single Women and the Legal Construction
of the Family and the State, 112 YALE L.J. 1641, 1652 (2003) (commenting on New York's
reform in the 1920s which replaced dower with a "facially sex-neutral elective share").
43 Id. at 119 (quoting Frank H. Twyeffort, The New Decedent Estate Law of New York, 6
N.Y.U.L. REV. 377 (1929)).
44 Id. (quoting COMBINED REPORTS OF THE DECEDENT ESTATE COMMISSION, Legis. Doc.
No. 70, at 19 (1928)).
45 N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-1.1-A(a)(2) (McKinney 2008); see Turnipseed,
supra note 1, at 739 (describing the elective share as "severely limit[ing] freedom of testa-
tion vis-i-vis surviving spouses").
46 In re Estate of Agioritis, 357 N.E.2d 979, 980-81 (N.Y. 1976).
47 Id. at 981.
2008]
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For example, Totten trusts and life insurance policies pass to a
beneficiary designated by the decedent upon his death and do not
pass through his will.48 Title to joint bank accounts also does not
pass by will, and instead passes to a surviving joint owner upon
the other owner's death. Accordingly, a spouse could effectively
disinherit his mate by writing her out of his will, transferring all
of his assets into non-probate form, and designating a third per-
son as the beneficiary of those assets. 49 The legislative history to
the EPTL notes that, because of this, the right of election under
the Decedent Estate Law became "diluted and to a large extent
meaningless."50
As a first attempt to prevent spouses from disinheriting each
other in this way, New York courts forbade so-called "illusory
transfers."'51 However, they differed in their analyses of whether
a transfer was illusory. In Bodner v. Feit,52 the Appellate Divi-
sion of the First Department found a transfer to be illusory
where: (1) the decedent's motive in making the transfer was only
to deprive his widow of her distributive share; and (2) the dece-
dent retained control over the property after the transfer. 53 Sub-
sequently, in Newman v. Dore, the Court of Appeals held that a
decedent's motive in making an inter vivos transfer was irrele-
48 See Garrison, supra note 24, at 1163 (noting that "inter vivos transfers were increa-
singly used in the 'evasion' of the widow's share"); see also Kwestel & Seplowitz, supra
note 18, at 4 (stating that a person could disinherit his spouse though lifetime transfers of
his assets, like Totten trusts and joint tenancies).
49 See Rena C. Seplowitz, Transfers Prior to Marriage and the Uniform Probate Code's
Redesigned Elective Share - Why the Partnership Is Not Yet Complete, 25 IND. L. REV. 1,
3-4 (1991) (explaining that Article II of the Uniform Probate Code made a significant step
in limiting types of evasive devices a decedent may use to disinherit a spouse); see also
Kwestel & Seplowitz, supra note 18, at 4 (pointing out that a testator can circumvent
forced share requirements to a surviving spouse by transferring all of his property to a
third person as a gift).
50 THIRD REPORT, supra note 2, at 23.
51 THIRD REPORT, supra, note 2 at 23 (explaining the history preceding enactment of the
EPTL); see also First Report of the Advisory Committee, supra note 5, at 2 (describing the
trend that coincided with enactment of the EPTL to give spouses greater protection when
the other spouse predeceases).
52 286 N.Y.S. 814 (App. Div. 1936).
53 See id. at 816-17 (holding that a spouse may not transfer his property inter vivos in
such a way that allows him to retain control over the property in order to defeat the rights
of the surviving spouse); see also In re Estate of Crystal, 352 N.E.2d 885, 887 (N.Y. 1976)
(Wachtler, J., dissenting) ("In Bodner the First Department in attempting to balance the
right to free alienation with the surviving spouse's right of election articulated a dual test
by which to evaluate an inter vivos transfer. One aspect to consider was the degree of con-
trol retained and the other was the motive or intent underlying the transfer.").
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vant in determining whether it was illusory. 54 Nonetheless, later
decisions ignored the Newman holding and took into account the
decedent's intention in transferring his property. 55
This confusion came to a head after In re Halpern, where the
Court of Appeals found that the decedent's Totten Trusts, which
named a beneficiary other than his spouse, were not illusory be-
cause they were not established with the intent to disinherit the
decedent's spouse.5 6 Contrary to prior case law, the Court did not
base its decision on whether the decedent retained control over
the accounts during his life. The decedent in Halpern certainly
retained control, as a depositor can continue making withdrawals
from and changes to a Totten Trust until his death, at which
time the account vests in a named beneficiary. 57 The Halpern de-
cision conflicted with Newman, where the Court of Appeals had
previously held that a revocable inter vivos trust, over which the
settlor retained the same degree of control as he would over a
Totten Trust "was illusory insofar as an electing spouse was con-
54 Newman v. Dore, 9 N.E.2d 966, 968 (N.Y. 1937) ("Motive or intent is an unsatisfacto-
ry test of the validity of a transfer of property. In most jurisdictions it has been rejected..
. ."); see President & Dirs. of Manhattan Co. v. Janowitz, 14 N.Y.S.2d 375, 383 (Sup. Ct.
1939) (stating that the term "bona fide" as used in this case does not refer to the motive
for making the gift, whether to deprive the wife of her property rights or not, but rather to
the intent of the donor to divest himself of title to the property).
55 See Marine Midland Trust Co. v. Stanford, 9 N.Y.S.2d 648, 651 (App. Div. 1939) ("The
determining factor as to the validity of a trust is the intent with which the settlor trans-
ferred his property to the trustee. If illusory, there is no transfer; if made with the intent
to transfer the actual title, it is effective."); see also In re Accounting of Chase Nat'l Bank,
108 N.Y.S.2d 122, 126 (App. Div. 1951) (focusing on whether the decedent had a good
faith intent to transfer a present interest in considering whether a transfer was illusory).
56 In re Estate of Halpern, 100 N.E.2d 120, 122 (N.Y. 1951) (finding Totten Trusts
created by the decedent to be valid inter vivos transfers because they were not "intended
only as a mask for effective retention by the settlor of the property which in form he had
conveyed"); see Newman, 9 N.E.2d at 969 (holding that testator's conveyance was illusory,
as it served only as a mask for his true intention of retaining the property he conveyed).
57 Farlex Free Dictionary, available at http://financialdictionary.thefreedictionary.com/
Totten+trust (last visited July 17, 2008) (defining a Totten Trust as "[a] trust in which the
assets are deposited for a beneficiary but the grantor has complete control of the trust,
including the right to reclaim the assets. The assets pass to the beneficiary upon the
death of the grantor but are taxed as part of the grantor's estate"); see Kara Peischl Mar-
cus, Totten Trusts: Pragmatic Pre-Death Planning or Post-Mortem Plunder?, 69 TEMP. L.
REV. 861, 866 (1996) (defining a Totten Trust as "a deposit [a person makes] in a savings
account in a bank or other savings organization in his own name as trustee for another
person intending to reserve a power to withdraw the whole or any part of the deposit at
any time during his lifetime and to use as his own whatever he may withdraw, or other-
wise to revoke the trust, the intended trust is enforceable by the beneficiary upon the
death of the depositor as to any part remaining on deposit on his death if he has not re-
voked the trust" (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 58 (1987))).
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cerned." 58 Legal minds struggled to determine whether Halpern
set forth a new test exclusively for Totten Trusts, or overruled
Newman by making determinative the decedent's motive in mak-
ing any transfer. 59
The only certainty after Halpern was that a transfer consi-
dered illusory, under whichever test a court might apply, was
invalid. 60 However, even the application of this well-settled prin-
ciple proved troublesome. Courts were inconsistent in how they
invalidated illusory transfers; some invalidated illusory transfers
in their entirety, while others only invalidated these transfers to
the extent necessary to satisfy a widow's elective share.61
Many considered the concept of the illusory transfer to be "ne-
bulous" for reasons apart from the fractured case law on the sub-
ject.62 This was due, in part, to the fact that usually only a scant
amount of evidence was admissible in an action to determine
whether a transfer was illusory. Proving the intent of the de-
58 In re Estate of Agioritis, 357 N.E.2d 979, 981 (N.Y. 1976).
59 See In re Estate of Crystal, 352 N.E.2d 885, 938 (Wachtler, J., dissenting) ("Any
doubt that the retention of control test articulated in Newman had been supplanted by
the intent test was fostered by In re Halpern . . . [which] been interpreted in two ways.
One view was that Halpern overruled Newman and that the only way a transfer would be
considered illusory is if it was an invalid, sham transfer .... The opposing view was that
Halpern simply created a special test with respect to Totten trusts.") (citations omitted);
see also Agioritis, 357 N.E.2d at 981 (explaining that "[o]ur court rejected the 'motive' test
in Newman v. Dore, ... and held that a revocable inter vivos trust with a retained life in-
terest with all investment and management powers reserved to the settlor was illusory
insofar as an electing spouse was concerned").
60 See In re Chase Nat'l Bank of N.Y., 108 N.Y.S.2d 122, 126 (App. Div. 1951) (stating
that a spouse could not be deprived of her elective share as a result of an illusory trans-
fer); see also Burns v. Turnbull, 41 N.Y.S.2d 448, 448 (App. Div. 1943) (holding that the
husband could not be deprived of the trust assets because the agreement was illusory).
61 See Yale Law Journal Co., Protection of the Surviving Spouse's Statutory Share
Against Inter Vivos Transfers by the Decedent, 52 YALE L. J. 656, 661 (1943) (arguing that
the Newman-Krause test of an illusory transfer does not decide the problem of whether
illusory transfers will be invalidated in favor of the surviving spouse when the decedent
has died intestate); see also Harvard Law Review Ass'n, Husband and Wife - Rights of
Wife Against Husband and in His Property - Widow's Statutory Share Does Not Extend to
Totten Trusts, 65 HARV. L. REV. 512, 512 (1952) (discussing case in which the New York
appellate division declared Totten trusts invalid only to the extent necessary to give a wi-
dow the equivalent of her elective share under N.Y. Decedent Estate Law § 18).
62 See In re Estate of Wechsler, 640 N.Y.S.2d 184, 185 (App. Div. 1996) (holding that pe-
titioner could not elect against an inter vivos trust nor could she "avail herself of the illu-
sory transfer doctrine, which was abolished in 1966 by the implementation of the testa-
mentary substitute scheme found in former EPTL 5-1.1"); see also Ralph C. Brashier,
Disinheritance and the Modern Family, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 83, 99 n.51 (1994) (stat-
ing that New York courts developed the nebulous concept of "illusory transfer" to rectify
improper transfers until legislation was enacted to close or narrow the gap).
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ceased spouse, which was necessary in some of these cases, was
extremely difficult because the decedent was unavailable to testi-
fy by reason of his own death. 63 Further, New York's "Dead Man"
statute bars from testifying an individual who engaged in a
transaction with the decedent and who has an interest in the
outcome in the litigation.64 In most instances, this precluded the
surviving spouse from testifying.
Due in part to the problems concerning spousal disinheritance,
the New York legislature enacted the EPTL in 1965.65 The legis-
lative history to the EPTL indicates that the purpose of the legis-
lative changes to the Decedent Estate Law's elective share provi-
sions was "to modernize in substance and protect the rights of a
surviving spouse."66 The terms of the EPTL permit a surviving
spouse to reach, through the exercise of her right of election, any
of the decedent's "testamentary substitutes."67 More specifically,
EPTL § 5-1.1 provided that a spouse may reach, through the ex-
ercise of her right of election: (1) gifts causa mortis; (2) Totten
trusts; (3) joint bank accounts held by the decedent and another
person; (4) real estate owned by the decedent as a joint tenancy
with another person; and (5) any disposition of property in "trust
or otherwise, to the extent that the decedent at the date of his
63 See Agioritis, 357 N.E.2d at 981 (stating that determining decedent's intent necessi-
tates inquiry into the decedent's state of mind, which is problematic); see also In re Mor-
ningstar's Will, 257 N.Y.S. 240, 241-43 (Sur. Ct. 1932) (emphasizing the difficulty in tes-
tamentary interpretation).
64 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4519 (McKinney 2008) (providing that a person who will gain or lose as
a result of the lawsuit is incompetent to testify as to a transaction with a person now dead
against the executor or administrator of that dead person's estate); see Tworkowski v.
Tworkowski, 696 N.Y.S.2d 637, 639 (Sup. Ct. 1999) (explaining that CPLR 4519 requires
three elements before it is applicable: (1) any person "interested in the event" may not
testify in his or her own behalf against (2) certain protected persons with a specified rela-
tionship to a decedent or mentally ill person (3) involving a transaction or communication
with the decedent or mentally ill person).
65 See THIRD REPORT, supra note 2, at 23, 181 (asserting the elective right under the
Decedent's Estate Law was "diluted" and the purpose of the EPTL was to modernize the
law and the need for reform in this area was a primary reason the Commission was
created); see also In re Will of Bogart, 607 N.Y.S.2d 1012, 1013 (Sur. Ct. 1994) (noting that
the purpose of EPTL 5-1.1A was to eliminate the unfairness to surviving spouses, eighty
percent of whom are believed to be women, and paternalism in the law).
66 THIRD REPORT, supra note 2, at 23.
67 Agioritis, 357 N.E.2d at 981-82 (drawing from legislative history of the EPTL); see In
re Estate of Crane, 649 N.Y.S.2d 1006, 1008 (Sur. Ct. 1996) (stating that provides a sur-
viving spouse the option to take a share of the net estate, including testamentary substi-
tutes, of the decedent spouse instead of the portion, if any, of the estate left to her under
the will or passing to her by intestacy).
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death retained, either alone or in conjunction with another per-
son, by the express provisions of the disposing instrument, a
power to revoke such disposition or a power to consume, invade
or dispose of the principal. . ... ,68 This section was amended
again in 1992, at which time it was renumbered as EPTL § 5-1.1-
A and the following were added to the list of testamentary substi-
tutes: (1) stocks held jointly by the testator and another person;
(2) 401k, pension and retirement accounts so long as the benefi-
ciary was named after September 1, 1992 or the beneficiary de-
signation was changed after that date; (3) gifts inter vivos made
within one year of the decedent's death and exceeding $11,000;
(4) U.S. savings bonds and securities; (5) all real property located
within or outside of the state; (6) money deposited in trust in the
name of the decedent for the benefit of another person; and (7)
property over which the decedent had a general power of ap-
pointment. 69
The EPTL contains additional protections for the surviving
spouse aside from those found in § 5-1.1A. Section 5-1.2 further
provides that a surviving spouse can be disqualified from exercis-
ing her right of election only where: (1) a final decree or judgment
of divorce, annulment, nullity or dissolution that is recognized as
valid in New York was in effect when the decedent spouse died;
(2) the marriage was either a prohibited marriage or void as in-
cestuous or bigamous as those terms are defined by the New
York Domestic Relations Law (hereinafter DRL);70 (3) a final de-
cree or judgment of divorce, annulment, nullity or dissolution is-
sued outside the state but not recognized as valid in New York
was in effect when the decedent spouse died; (4) a final decree or
judgment of separation, recognized as valid in New York, was in
effect at the time of the decedent's death and was rendered
against the surviving spouse; (5) the surviving spouse abandoned
the deceased spouse and abandonment continued until the time
of death; or (6) the surviving spouse had a duty to support the
decedent but failed to do so despite having had the means, unless
the surviving spouse eventually resumed and continued provid-
ing support until the decedent's death.71 These limited grounds
68 N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW §§ 5-1.1(b)(1)(A)-(E) (McKinney 2008).
69 Id. §§ 5-1.1-A(b)(1)(A)-(I).
70 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 5 (McKinney 2008).
71 N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW §§ 5-1.2(a)(I)-(6).
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for disqualification fail to account for many circumstances in
which a surviving spouse should not be entitled to elect against
the decedent's will because she did not contribute to the dece-
dent's life as a true spouse would have.
In going to extremes to protect the surviving spouse, the New
York legislature has neglected to protect the decedent spouse and
his estate. This is particularly important because the deceased
spouse cannot defend his rights in death, and his heirs and rep-
resentatives will struggle to do so without the benefit of his tes-
timony. At least one member of the legal community has recog-
nized this problem. In a 2000 decision, Surrogate Holtzmann
observed that there are "numerous instances where the provi-
sions of EPTL [§] 5-1.2 are insufficient to protect estates from
unworthy surviving spouses."72 Accordingly, we, in New York,
find ourselves at another crossroads in this area of estates law.
Just as the EPTL was once believed to be the much-needed re-
medy for the inadequacies of certain parts of the Decedent Estate
Law, New York again needs a statutory solution, only this time
to ameliorate the shortcomings of the EPTL § 5-1.2.
II. PROBLEMS THAT HAVE RESULTED AND WILL RESULT FROM
THE LIMITED GROUNDS FOR SPOUSAL DISQUALIFICATION UNDER
EPTL § 5-1.2
A. Problems Already Confronted By New York Courts
Several cases have come before the New York courts in which a
surviving spouse could not be disqualified under EPTL § 5-1.2,
notwithstanding the fact that the presiding Surrogate believed
that result to be unjust and inconsistent with public policy.73
Specifically, Surrogates found that the language of the EPTL
prevented them from disqualifying surviving spouses who had
lived apart from, and had no communication with, their mates for
more than a decade, as well as a surviving spouse who had never
72 See Margaret Valentine Turano, Supplementary Practice Commentaries, N.Y. EST.
POWERS & TRUSTS § 5-1.2 (McKinney Supp. 2008) (discussing In re Estate of Lamos, 313
N.Y.S.2d 781 (Sur. Ct. 1970), and In re Estate of Carmona, 223 N.Y.L.J. 92 (Sur. Ct.
2000)).
73 See In re Estate of Gonzalez, No. 701P2204, 2005 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3463, at *10-*12
(Sur. Ct. 2005) (explaining decedent's spouse was not disqualified despite proposed legis-
lation that would prohibit "laughing spouses" from inheriting).
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lived with the decedent and married her solely to obtain U.S. ci-
tizenship.
i. Non-Judicial Divorces 74
To date, it remains very difficult for a couple to divorce in the
state of New York. 75 Prior to 1967, the only ground for divorce in
New York was adultery.7 6 After 1967, the New York legislature
added cruel and inhuman treatment, abandonment, and a jail
term of three or more years as additional fault grounds for di-
vorce. 77 The only way for a couple to obtain a no-fault divorce in
New York is to execute a separation agreement and to live apart
in substantial compliance with its terms for at least one year.78 If
the couple satisfies these requirements, they may seek to have
their separation converted to a divorce. 79 If both spouses cannot
74 For the purposes of this Note, the author refers to situations in which spouses sever
all ties without legally divorcing as "non-judicial divorces." Some states recognize these
circumstances as "de facto divorces." For example, Ohio permits couples that live sepa-
rately and apart for at least one year, without more, to legally divorce. OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 3105.01(B) (West 2007).
75 See Neal R. Feigenson, Extraterritorial Recognition of Divorce Decrees in the Nine-
teenth Century, 34 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 119, 157 (1990) (stating that, to date, it remains
impossible to get divorced in New York absent a showing of fault on the part of one spouse
or a one year separation accompanied by comprehensive agreement between the spouses
that encompasses financial and custody issues); see also Marsha Garrison, Good Inten-
tions Gone Awry: The Impact of New York's Equitable Distribution Law on Divorce Out-
comes, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 621, 637 (1991) (noting that "New York is one of four remaining
states that permit divorce only upon a showing of fault or upon spousal agreement").
76 See Adriaen M. Morse Jr., Comment, Fault: A Viable Means of Re-Injecting Responsi-
bility in Marital Relations, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 605, 608 n.12 (1996) ('With the enactment
of the Divorce Reform Law of 1966, New York abandoned its position as the only State in
the union which regarded adultery as the sole ground for absolute divorce"' (quoting
Christian v. Christian, 365 N.E.2d 849, 852 (N.Y. 1977))); see also J. Herbie DiFonzo &
Ruth C. Stern, Addicted to Fault: Why Divorce Reform Has Lagged in New York, 27 PACE
L. REV. 559, 579-85 (2007) (asserting that adultery was the sole ground for divorce in New
York until 1967 when the Divorce Reform Act of 1966, which provided for the additional
grounds found today in N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW. § 170, was enacted).'
77 See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 170(1)-(3) (McKinney 2008) (providing the grounds upon
which a spouse can premise a divorce action); see also N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW, L. 1962, ch.
313, (repealed 1966) (declaring that adultery is the sole grounds for divorce).
78 Id. § 170(6). In addition to these requirements, there are other procedural require-
ments. Id. Couples must acknowledge the agreement in the form required to entitle a
deed to be recorded, and must also be filed with the county clerk in a county where either
party resides. Id.; see Id. § 170 note (Bender, LEXIS through 2008 legislation) (Converting
the Legal Separation to Divorce). A no fault divorce in New York requires affirmative
proof that the couple complied with § 170(6).
79 See Linda Fitts Mischler, Personal Morals Masquerading as Professional Ethics:
Regulations Banning Sex Between Domestic Relations Attorneys and their Clients, 23
HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 5 n.328 (2000) (illustrating how states that do not have fault
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come to such an agreement, either spouse may seek a court-
ordered separation decree. However, the party seeking the de-
cree must prove either a traditional fault ground for divorce or
failure to support.8 0 A separation decree can only be converted to
a divorce decree after the parties have lived apart in substantial
compliance with its terms for at least one year.81
Because it is both difficult and expensive to obtain a divorce,8 2
many couples do what, in effect, amounts to a non-judicial di-
vorce. Simply stated, these couples part ways and live as if they
had legally divorced.8 3 They divide their property between them-
selves, live separately and apart from one another, rarely or nev-
er communicate, maintain separate finances, and ultimately lead
separate, unmarried lives.8 4 The failure to legally divorce in New
York comes with at least one significant legal consequence: New
York courts have held that under EPTL § 5-1.2, a spouse cannot
be disqualified where the couple never legally divorced, but lived
grounds may have "quasi no-fault" grounds through this conversion mechanism (citing §
170(5))); see also N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 170 note (Bender, LEXIS through 2008 legislation)
(Converting the Legal Separation to Divorce) (clarifying that in New York, a party may
convert a legal separation into a divorce. These 'quasi no fault' grounds however are not
automatic. New York requires grounds to be proven") (italics in original).
80 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 170(5); see Bernard Rothman, Esq.,
http://www.newyorkdivorcelawyer.comluncontesteddivorce.html (last visited Aug. 10,
2008) (explaining how to obtain a separation decree).
81 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 170(5); see Rothman, supra note 80 (detailing the requirements
for converting a separation decree to a divorce).
82 See Amy C. Henderson, Comment, Meaningful Access to the Courts?: Assessing Self-
Represented Litigants' Ability to Obtain a Fair, Inexpensive Divorce in Missouri's Court
System, 72 U.M.K.C.L. REV. 571, 573 (2003) ("The price of obtaining a divorce [in the
United States] with the help of a lawyer varies depending on the complexity of the case.
For example, an uncontested divorce that does not go to court will cost around $16,500,
whereas a contested divorce that proceeds to trial could cost more than $150,000. Howev-
er, the average price for obtaining a divorce is around $20,000."); see also Janet A. John-
son, Symposium on the Miller Commission of Matrimonial Law, 27 PACE L. REV. 539, 540
(2007) (arguing that obtaining a divorce in New York is "expensive, emotionally draining
and uncertain").
83 See In re Estate of Lamos, 313 N.Y.S.2d 781, 782 (Sur. Ct. 1970). Surrogate Sobel, in
Lamos, described the surviving and decedent spouses' living situation as one in which
they lived apart for more than fourteen years and had absolutely no communication with
one another. Id. Surrogate Sobel pointed out that Surrogate's courts had encountered sim-
ilar cases at the time Lamos was decided in 1970. Id. at 785. The court again encountered
this situation in 2000 in Carmona. In re Estate of Carmona, 223 N.Y.L.J. 92 (Sur. Ct.
2000).
84 See Carmona, 223 N.Y.L.J. 92 (describing how the spouses lived separate lives for
nearly fourteen years); see also Lamos, 313 N.Y.S.2d at 782 ("The parties lived together
for a short three years. Prior to Mrs. Lamos' death in 1968, the parties had lived separate-
ly and apart without any communication whatsoever for over 14 years.").
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as if divorced for as many as fifty years.8 5
For example, in Matter of Lamos, the deceased spouse, Mrs.
Lamos, and the surviving spouse, Mr. Lamos, had lived apart
and had no communication whatsoever for more than fourteen
years prior to Mrs. Lamos's death.8 6 Before their separation, they
had lived together for only three years.8 7 After Mrs. Lamos died,
Mr. Lamos sought to elect against Mrs. Lamos's will.88
Because no decree of divorce, separation, annulment or disso-
lution was in effect at the date of Mrs. Lamos's death, the only
possible grounds for disqualifying Mr. Lamos were either that he
had abandoned Mrs. Lamos, or that he had failed to support
her.8 9 In order to prove abandonment or failure to support, a de-
cedent's estate must establish that the decedent, during his life-
time, would have been entitled to a decree of separation on those
grounds. 90 To prove abandonment, the decedent's estate must
show that the surviving spouse's departure from the marital ab-
ode was "unjustified and without the consent of the other
spouse."91 To prove failure to support, the decedent's estate must
show that the surviving spouse failed to support the deceased
spouse although she desired such support, that the decedent had
the means to provide support, and that the surviving spouse had
not been guilty of misconduct that would have absolved the dece-
dent of his duty to support her.92
The burden of proving abandonment or breach of the duty to
s5 See Margaret Valentine Turano, Supplementary Practice Commentaries, N.Y. EST.
POWERS & TRUSTS § 5-1.2 (McKinney Supp. 2008) (stating that couples who have lived
apart for 50 years still cannot be disqualified under § 5-1.2); see also Lamos, 313 N.Y.S.2d
at 782-85 (holding that a spouse could not be disqualified despite having lived apart from
the decedent for fourteen years).
86 Lamos, 313 N.Y.S.2d at 782.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 782-83.
90 See In re Estate of Mead, 119 N.Y.S.2d 579, 581 (App. Div. 1953) (stating that what
would be a successful establishment for a judgment for separation on grounds of either
abandonment or neglect is sufficient to prove abandonment for these purposes); see also
Lamos, 313 N.Y.S.2d at 783 (explaining the rule that grounds for abandonment must be
sufficient to sustain a judgment of separation).
91 Lamos, 313 N.Y.S.2d at 783.
92 Id. at 784 (stating the elements which must be met for a husband who failed to sup-
port his wife to be found to have forfeited his right to elect against his wife's will (quoting
In re Estate of Barc, 31 N.Y.S.2d 139 (Sur. Ct. 1941))).
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support rests with the representatives of the decedent's estate. 93
Because of the decedent's unavailability, it is frequently impossi-
ble for the estate to prove its claims. If the burden rested with
the surviving spouse to prove that he did not abandon the dece-
dent or breach his duty to support her, it would also be nearly
impossible for him meet this burden because his testimony would
be subject to preclusion under the Dead Man's statute.94 Essen-
tially, either party would likely lose its case if saddled with the
burden of proof. In actuality, because the burden rests with the
estate, the estate is often the losing party, even when that result
is not fair or just. This is precisely what happened in Lamos,
where "[d]espite the proof of short cohabitation-and long sepa-
ration without support-the witnesses called [by the decedent's
estate] to establish [that the surviving spouse should be disquali-
fied] failed to do so."95
Accordingly, although Mr. and Mrs. Lamos had not lived to-
gether or acted as a married couple for more than a decade, Sur-
rogate Sobel held that Mr. Lamos was entitled to elect against
Mrs. Lamos's will.96 However, Surrogate Sobel emphatically be-
lieved the outcome to be an "obviously unjust" result of the
"present state of the law in this frequently recurring and trouble-
some area."
97
Similarly, in In re Carmona, the decedent, Mrs. Carmona, and
her husband9" had lived apart for 14 years prior to Mrs. Carmo-
na's death. 99 Mrs. Carmona died without a will, leaving her hus-
93 See In re Estate of Maiden, 31 N.E.2d 889, 889 (N.Y. 1940) (explaining that aban-
donment must be established by the party asserting it); see also In re Estate of Rechtshaf-
fen, 16 N.E.2d 357, 358 (N.Y. 1938) (stating that a party alleging that a decedent's spouse
should be disqualified from exercising his right of election bears the burden of proof).
94 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4519 (McKinney 2008) (outlining that an interested party cannot
testify as a witness in an action against the executor of the deceased person concerning a
communication between the witness and the deceased person); see also Lamos, 313
N.Y.S.2d at 784 (stating that the surviving spouse is incompetent to testify to "transac-
tions" between himself and the surviving spouse).
95 Lamos, 313 N.Y.S.2d at 785.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 782.
98 The opinion in this case does not refer to Mrs. Carmona's husband by a proper name,
but only as "Mrs. Carmona's husband," seemingly to protect his identity as a result of the
egregious allegations against him. For brevity's sake, he will be referred to here as "Mr.
Carmona," while the author acknowledges that the opinion does not refer to him as such.
99 In re Estate of Carmona, 223 N.Y.L.J. 92 (Sur. Ct. 2000).
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band as her sole statutory distributee. 10 0 The Carmonas had a
daughter, Angela, but she predeceased Mrs. Carmona by approx-
imately four months.10 1 Mrs. Carmona's mother petitioned the
court for letters of administration, arguing that Mr. Carmona
was disqualified as a surviving spouse pursuant to EPTL § 5-
1.2.102 Mr. Carmona asserted that he was not disqualified and
sought to be appointed the administrator of Mrs. Carmona's es-
tate as her sole statutory distributee.10 3
At trial, Mrs. Carmona's mother, brother and nephew all testi-
fied that Mrs. Carmona and Angela had almost no relationship
with Mr. Carmona in the 14 years before Mrs. Carmona's
death.104 They claimed the relationship ended because Mrs. Car-
mona had found that her husband engaged in sexual relations
with his sister, and because Mr. Carmona had admitted to fa-
thering two of his sister's children.10 5 Mrs. Carmona's relatives
further asserted that Mrs. Carmona and Angela moved out of the
marital residence permanently at that time, and that they had
little, if any, contact with Mr. Carmona thereafter.106 Mr. Car-
mona denied that he ever had a sexual relationship with sister.
He called his neighbors as witnesses, and they likewise testified
that they never knew of any such sexual relationship. 0 7 Mr.
Carmona and his neighbors further testified that Mrs. Carmona
and Angela would often visit Mr. Carmona at the former marital
residence, and that Mr. Carmona had offered some degree of fi-
nancial support to his wife and daughter. 08
Surrogate Holzman noted that the burden of proving that Mr.
Carmona had either abandoned the decedent or failed to support
her rested with the petitioner, Mrs. Carmona's mother, 0 9 On the
100 Compare Carmona, 223 N.Y.L.J. 92, with N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-
1.1(a)(2) (McKinney 2008) (providing that where a decedent dies without a will and is
survived by a spouse and no issue, his entire estate passes to the surviving spouse by op-
eration of law).
101 Carmona, 223 N.Y.L.J. 92.
102 Id.
103 Id.; see N.Y. SUR. CT. PROC. ACT LAW § 1001(1)(a) (McKinney 2008) (stating that,
where a decedent leaves a surviving spouse, letters of administration will issue to the
surviving spouse).
104 Carmona, 223 N.Y.L.J. 92.
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 Id.
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issue of abandonment, Surrogate Holzman found that Mr. Car-
mona had not abandoned Mrs. Carmona, because it was Mrs.
Carmona who departed from the marital residence and both par-
ties had consented to her departure. 110 Though the court noted
that a refusal to cease having sexual relations with his sister
would have constituted constructive abandonment, it ultimately
found that Mrs. Carmona's mother had not proven that to be true
by a preponderance of the evidence.11' On the issue of failure to
support, Mrs. Carmona's mother also failed to meet her burden of
proving that Mr. Carmona had the financial means to provide
support and that Mrs. Carmona had sought such support.11 2 For
these reasons, Surrogate Holzman concluded that Mr. Carmona
was not disqualified under EPTL § 5-1.2, and therefore Mrs.
Carmona's mother was not entitled to inherit from her daughter
in intestacy nor to be appointed the administrator of her daugh-
ter's estate. 113
However, Surrogate Holzman did not end his opinion with the
disposition of these issues. Instead, he dedicated three para-
graphs to pointing out the shortcomings of EPTL § 5-1.2 and to
recommending legislative changes thereto. 114 Surrogate Holzman
wrote that the result compelled by the statute in this case was
"neither in accord with the probable wishes of the decedent
nor... supported by any public policy considerations."'1 5 Fur-
ther, he wrote that Justice Sobel had been correct more than
twenty years earlier in Lamos when he wrote that the provisions
of EPTL § 5-1.2 are insufficient to protect estates from unworthy
surviving spouses. In addition, he noted that since Lamos there
have been "additional illustrations, including the instant case, of
results which are contrary to the wishes of the decedent and ben-
efit a survivor who had no right to expect to receive anything of
pecuniary value from the decedent while she was alive."11 6 Final-
ly, Surrogate Holzman recommended that the legislature address
this problem by enacting a law that would allow a surviving
spouse to be disqualified if a married couple mutually agreed to
110 Id.
"I Id.
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 Id.
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part ways and then lived apart for a period of between three and
five years. 117
Surrogates Sobel and Holzman are not alone in their opinion
that EPTL § 5-1.2 provides insufficient protection for the dece-
dent spouse and his estate. Some legal scholars have also opined
that the statute is inadequate, and have recommended that the
legislature consider amending it.118 A proposal for legislative
change can be found infra at Section III.
ii. Sham Marriages
Recently, the Bronx County Surrogate's Court considered a
case in which the decedent and surviving spouse had married
solely to enable the surviving spouse to become a U.S. citizen. 119
The decedent, Julia Dominguez, perished aboard American Air-
lines Flight 587, which crashed in Queens, New York in 2001.120
After Julia's death, her daughter, Ixia Hernandez, petitioned the
court to disqualify Julia's husband, Diego Mercedes, from exercis-
ing his right of election. 121 Ixia alleged that Diego was disquali-
fied because the marriage was nothing more than a "sham green
card marriage. . . [entered into so Diego could] gain favorable
immigration status."1 22
At trial, Diego testified that he married Julia for love, and that
the two consummated the marriage on the night it occurred and
at other times thereafter. 23 Several friends of Diego also testified
117 Id.
118 See Margaret Valentine Turano, Supplementary Practice Commentaries, N.Y. EST.
POWERS & TRUSTS § 5-1.2 (McKinney Supp. 2008) (asserting that the author agrees with
Surrogate Holzman that the New York legislature "should consider amending the statute"
to avoid the sort of inequitable results seen in Carmona and Lamos); see also
SURROGATE'S COURT ADVISORY COMM., REPORT OF THE SURROGATE'S COURT ADVISORY
COMMITTEE TO THE CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE OF THE COURTS OF THE STATE OF NEW
YORK 21 (2004) [hereinafter REPORT OF THE SURROGATE'S COURT ADVISORY COMMITTEE]
(recommending that "section 5-1.2(a) of the Estates, Powers and Trusts Law be amended
to disqualify as surviving spouses persons who for a prolonged period prior to a decedent's
death were married to the decedent in name only").
119 In re Estate of Dominguez, No. 082774/99, 2002 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1596, at *1-*2
(Sur. Ct. Nov. 18, 2002). In Dominguez, the decedent's daughter was petitioning for is-
suance of letters of administration to herself and not the decedent's spouse, who the dece-
dent's daughter alleged was married to the decedent in a "sham green card marriage,"
thus being disqualified under EPTL § 5-1.2. Id. at *2.
120 Id. at *1-*2.
121 Id.
122 Id. at *2.
123 Id. at *2-*4.
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that Diego and Julia held themselves out to be married, and one
specifically testified that the two shared a bedroom while on va-
cation with him.' 24 Diego further testified that, even though he
resided in Canada throughout their marriage, he would frequent-
ly visit Julia in the Bronx and spend the night with her at her
apartment, although he never permanently had a key to her
home. 125 It was also established that immediately after three of
Diego's other marriages, he had attempted to complete immigra-
tion paperwork in the United States or in Canada, but was never
able to obtain citizenship status. 126
In contrast, Ixia testified that her mother's relationship with
Diego was only platonic, and both Ixia and her sisters claimed
that Diego had slept at their mother's apartment on only a few
occasions, and always on the sofa by himself.127 One of Ixia's sis-
ters further testified that her mother told her she married Diego
"for papers," and that she had slept in her mother's bedroom,
with her mother, on the night Julia married Diego. 128 Julia's sis-
ter gave similar testimony to that of her nieces, claiming that Ju-
lia had told her that she married Diego in exchange for $3,000 so
that he could obtain citizenship.1 29 In addition, Julia's boyfriend,
Mateo Eurena, testified that he had a continuous romantic rela-
tionship with Julia for eight years before her death, and that he
never knew that Julia and Diego were married. 130
The court held that Ixia had proven, by clear and convincing
evidence, that her mother married Diego solely to assist him in
attaining citizenship.' 3' However, the court refused to disqualify
Diego as Julia's surviving spouse under EPTL § 5-1.2.132 Al-
though their marriage was likely voidable on the grounds of
fraud, EPTL § 5-1.2 states that a spouse can be disqualified only
where "[a] final decree or judgment of divorce, of annulment or
declaring the nullity of a marriage or dissolving such marriage on
the grounds of absence, recognized as valid under the laws of this
124 Id. at *5.
125 Id. at *6.
126 Id. at *6-*7.
127 Id. at *7.
128 Id. at *7-*8.
129 Id. at *9.
130 Id. at *9-*10.
131 Id. at *11.
132 Id. at *13.
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state, was in effect when the deceased spouse died."133 Because no
decree of annulment was in effect when Julia died, Diego could
not be disqualified as a result of the "sham" marriage. 134 The
court also declined to use its equity powers to "add a 'sham mar-
riage for immigration purposes' as a statutory grounds for disqu-
alification where the legislature has failed to enact such a provi-
sion."135
In a lucky twist for Julia's family, however, the court disquali-
fied Diego under EPTL § 5-1.2 on the grounds that the marriage
was void as bigamous because Diego had never procured a valid
divorce from his second wife and/or Julia had never procured a
valid divorce from her first husband. 36 Had Julia's marriage to
Diego not been bigamous, her family would have lost the battle
over her estate.
The "sham marriage" situation differs from that of the non-
judicial divorce because, with respect to the latter, husband and
wife lived as such for a time before parting ways. In the instance
of a sham marriage, the parties never actually lived together as
husband and wife. However, in a sham marriage for immigration
purposes, the parties actually intended to be married and to take
advantage of the rights that flow from marriage, at least with re-
spect to citizenship status. In the case of a non-judicial divorce,
the parties intend to extinguish their marital relationship and
the rights resulting from it. In either instance, two things are
clear: (1) the couple's so-called marital relationship does not re-
semble a true marriage at law or in fact; and (2) each member of
the couple did not intend to, or at least never contemplated, giv-
ing his or her spouse one-third of his or her estate.
B. A New Problem on the Horizon
In general, people today are living longer13 7 and the elderly are
133 N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-1.2(a)(1) (McKinney 2008) (emphasis added).
134 Dominguez, 2002 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1596, at *14.
135 Id. at *16.
136 Id. at *26-*27.
137 See Gina Kolata, So Big and Healthy Grandpa Wouldn't Even Know You, N.Y.
TIMES, Jul. 30, 2006, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/30/health/30age.html?
pagewanted=print (observing that humans are living longer lives); see also JUDITH E.
TINTINALLI, TINTINALLI'S EMERGENCY MEDICINE (6th ed. 2003), available at
http://www.accessmedicine.com/content.aspx?aID=610128 (projecting that by 2020, 25% of
the population will be aged 65 or older).
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relying heavily on non-familial caretakers. 138 This has placed
many elderly individuals in a vulnerable position in which their
caretakers have the ability to exploit them and their finances. 139
Recent cases have highlighted the alarming trend of caretakers
and service providers who financially exploit their elderly em-
ployers after marrying them, and have held that such marriages
are voidable on the grounds that the ward lacked capacity to
marry. 140
In 2007, the New York State Supreme Court annulled the mar-
riage of "A.S.", an 89-year old woman, and Victor Castro, her 57-
year old chauffer.' 41 A New York court adjudicated A.S. incapaci-
tated and appointed her daughter, Carmen, as her guardian. 42
The court gave Carmen many powers, including the power to
seek an annulment of A.S.'s marriage to Victor.1 43 From its incep-
tion, A.S.'s marriage was kept secret from Carmen and A.S.'s
grandson, with whom she had close relationships. 144 Castro used
the marriage to complete immigration papers necessary to bring
his daughter to the United States from Ecuador two weeks after
the alleged marriage ceremony took place.1 45 Three years later,
Carmen learned of her mother's marriage to Castro for the first
time while her mother was hospitalized after having a heart at-
'38 See In re Estate of Burke, 441 N.Y.S.2d 542, 549 (App. Div. 1981) ("With the general
increase in the longevity of men and women, the elderly population in this nation has in-
creased and will continue to do so, and, with such demographic change, more and more of
the elderly will find themselves in the care of nursing home proprietors."); see also
TINTINALLI, supra note 137 (asserting that even a minor injury like a sprained ankle may
render an elderly person incapacitated and that "many older persons need to rely on care-
takers").
139 Compare Burke, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 549 ("It is inevitable that the aged and infirm, un-
der such circumstances, will become very dependent upon those who tend their wants,
and a high degree of confidentiality will develop under which the aged will reveal to them
their closest thoughts and the state of their financial affairs"), with supra note 137 and
138 and accompanying text (presenting the evidence that people are living longer lives).
140 See In re Joseph S., 808 N.Y.S.2d 426, 428-29 (App. Div. 2006) (holding that the an-
nulment of a marriage is "an available remedy" where there is evidence that a party is
"incapable of understanding the nature, effect, and consequences of the marriage); In re
Application for A.S., No. 20493/062007, 2007 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2693, at *16 (Sup. Ct. Apr.
24, 2007) (illustrating that a marriage is declared null and void when a party is unable to
understand 'the nature, effect, and consequences of the marriage"' (quoting Joseph S.,
808 N.Y.S.2d at 428)).
141 Application for A.S., 2007 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2693, at *2.
142 Id. at *1.
143 Id.
144 Id. at *7.
145 Id.
ST JOHN'S JOURNAL OFLEGAL COMMENTARY
tack and stroke.146 A.S.'s daughter also discovered that several of
A.S.'s bank accounts had been depleted and that Castro's daugh-
ters were living rent-free in A.S.'s properties. 147 The court de-
clared the marriage null and void under DRL § 140(c), on the
ground that A.S. lacked capacity to marry and, in the alternative,
under DRL § 140(e), on the- ground that A.S.'s chauffer had com-
mitted fraud by marrying A.S. solely to lawfully bring his daugh-
ter to the United States. 148
Similarly, in In re Joseph S., the Appellate Division upheld a
trial court's decision to annul the marriage of Joseph S. and his
caretaker, Juanita Kho. 149 Kho was 43 years younger than Jo-
seph, who was hard of hearing, suffered from severe short-term
memory loss, and was entirely unable to care himself.150 Al-
though Joseph had not been diagnosed as suffering from any psy-
chiatric or mental disease, the court annulled the marriage on
the ground that Joseph lacked capacity to consent to marriage. 151
The court found that Kho's motives were questionable, especially
considering that Joseph had ceased his previously active social
life and became isolated from numerous longtime trusted
friends. 152
The facts of A.S. and Joseph S. portray greedy, non-familial ca-
retakers who victimize their elderly and vulnerable employers.
Unfortunately, in our society, elder abuse is becoming increasing-
ly common. 153 The courts and the parties in these cases were for-
tunate because the actions to annul the marriages were initiated
before the incapacitated individuals died. Had A.S. or Joseph S.
died before the annulments of their respective marriages, their
caretakers would have had the opportunity to exercise their
spousal rights of election. According to the precedent set by the
only case considering elder abuse and the right of election, 154 nei-
146 Id. at *10.
147 Id. at *12.
148 Id. at *16--*17.
149 In re Estate of Joseph S., 808 N.Y.S.2d 426, 428 (App. Div. 2006).
1 5 0 Id.
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 See In re Burke, 441 N.Y.S.2d 542, 549 (App. Div. 1981) ("Although the vast majority
of those who care for the aged are honest and dedicated professionals, the relationship is
one from which the greedy and corrupt may find considerable gain.").
154 In re Application of Wang, No. 2488/2006, 2008 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4031 (Sur. Ct. Ju-
ly 3, 2008).
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ther spouse could have been disqualified, as EPTL § 5-1.2 re-
quires an annulment to be in effect at the decedent's death in or-
der to disqualify a spouse.
In In re Application of Wang, Irving Berk died at one hundred
years of age, leaving an estate worth in excess of $5 million to his
sons and grandchildren. 155 Several months after Irving's death,
his sons learned for the first time that their father had married
his 47-year-old nurse, Judy Wang, within a year of his death. 15 6
Wang, who was not provided for in Irving's will, moved for sum-
mary judgment seeking to assert her right of election as Irving's
surviving spouse. 15 7 Irving's sons opposed the motion, arguing
that the marriage should be annulled because their father, who
was 99-years-old at the time of the marriage, lacked the capacity
to enter the marriage and the marriage was procured by fraud,
duress or force. 158 The Kings County Surrogate's Court rejected
these arguments and granted summary judgment to Wang. 159
Surrogate Johnson ruled that, even if a post mortem annulment
were granted, it "would not defeat [Wang's] right of election as a
surviving spouse as [her] right to elect against the Estate became
fixed and unalterable upon Irving Berk's death."'160 Further, Sur-
rogate Johnson stated that she could not "write disqualifications
into EPTL § 5-1.2"161 and that even though the outcome "may ap-
pear incongruous ... [it] is simply the state of the law."'162
III. A PROPOSAL FOR LEGISLATIVE CHANGE AND SUPPORTING
POLICY REASONS
A. Policy Reasons for Legislative Change
Given the reluctance of courts to reinterpret EPTL § 5-1.2 de-
spite the unjust consequences that sometimes result from its lit-
eral application, it is clear that legislative change is necessary.
There are two main policy justifications for such change. First,
155 Id. at *1-*2.
156 Id. at *12.
157 Id. at *1.
158 Id. at *6, *12.
159 Id. at *13.
160 Id. at *7.
161 Id. at *12
162 Id.
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the EPTL is not harmonious with the DRL. In certain situations
where a marriage is voidable under the DRL, a deceased individ-
ual's estate can seek a post mortem annulment that terminates
any rights to which surviving "spouse" would have been entitled.
However, such a spouse may still elect to the decedent's will un-
der the EPTL, which only permits disqualification where the an-
nulment was effective at the date of the decedent's death.
Second, when one examines the EPTL's legislative history, it is
apparent that its drafters were entirely preoccupied with protect-
ing the surviving spouse. This preoccupation has led to problems
because that position is both extreme and outdated. Today's cul-
tural climate is such that the surviving spouse needs somewhat
less protection and the deceased's estate needs more than the
EPTL presently provides. In particular, a shift in the traditional
roles of husband and wife, the increased incidence of elder abuse,
and changes to the notion of marriage itself warrant reconsidera-
tion by the legislature of the statutory grounds for spousal disqu-
alification.
i. Tension between the EPTL and the DRL with respect to
voidable marriages
An examination of the legislative history to the EPTL illu-
strates that the Commission provided no discussion of the disqu-
alification of spouses in the case of voidable marriages. By its
own words, the Commission never considered "the rules by which
one would ascertain whether a particular claimant has entered
into a valid marriage with the decedent," as doing so would have
required "a textbook on the law of Domestic Relations. ' 163 The
most significant problem that has resulted from this is that, in
some instances, the EPTL effectively allows a so-called spouse to
exercise her right of election, a right conferred only by marriage,
even where the New York State Supreme Court has granted a
post mortem annulment of that marriage. 164 More specifically,
163 FOURTH REPORT, supra note 25, at 275.
164 See id.; see also N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 140(c) (McKinney 2008); N.Y. EST. POWERS &
TRUSTS LAW § 5-1.2 (McKinney 2008). The New York Domestic Relations law provides
that a marriage may be annulled after the death of one of the spouses in certain circums-
tances. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 140(c) (McKinney 2008). The Estates Powers and Trusts
law, however, states that a spouse may only be disqualified if the annulment was in effect
at the time of decedent's death. N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-1.2 (McKinney
2008). Therefore, a court may annul a marriage after the death of one of the parties, but
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DRL § 140 specifically provides that annulments may be ob-
tained after the death of one of the spouses in certain circums-
tances, while EPTL § 5-1.2 refuses to give force and effect to an-
nulments that were not in effect at the time of the decedent's
death. 165
The DRL provides that a post-mortem annulment may be ob-
tained where the consent of the deceased spouse to the marriage
was procured by force, duress or fraud, 166 and where one of the
spouses was either mentally ill or mentally retarded and thus in-
capable of consenting.167 After the death of the non-offending par-
ty, any family member that has an interest in avoiding the mar-
riage may seek an annulment while the remaining spouse is still
alive, 168 the effect of which is to put an end to the marriage from
the beginning, 169 thus destroying it "as a source of rights and du-
ties."170
Nevertheless, EPTL § 5-1.2 provides that a post mortem decree
of annulment will not result in the disqualification of a surviving
spouse. 171 Accordingly, the EPTL permits a person to inherit as
though he were the surviving spouse of the decedent even if the
such annulment will not serve to disqualify the surviving spouse from inheriting by virtue
of a non-existent marriage.
165 Compare N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§ 140(c), (e) (McKinney 2008) (describing circums-
tances in which an action to annul a marriage may be brought after the death of one of
the spouses to the marriage), with N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-1.2 (McKinney
2008) (providing that a decree of dissolution, separation, divorce or annulment must be in
effect at the time of the decedent's death in order to disqualify his surviving spouse).
166 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 140(e) (McKinney 2008) (stating that an action to annul a
marriage for fraud, duress or force "may also be maintained during the life-time of the
[offending] party by the parent, or the guardian of the person of the party whose consent
was so obtained, or by any relative of that party who has an interest to avoid the mar-
riage, provided that in an action to annul a marriage on the ground of fraud the limitation
prescribed in the civil practice law and rules has not run.").
167 See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 140(c) (McKinney 2008) ("An action to annul a marriage
on the ground that one of the parties thereto was a mentally retarded person may be
maintained at any time during the life-time of either party by any relative of a mentally
retarded person, who has an interest to avoid the marriage. An action to annul a marriage
on the ground that one of the parties thereto was a mentally ill person may be maintained
... after the death of the mentally ill person in that condition, and during the life of the
other party to the marriage, by any relative of the mentally ill person who has an interest
to avoid the marriage.") (emphasis added).
168 See supra note 166-67 and accompanying text.
169 Sleicher v. Sleicher, 167 N.E. 501, 502 (N.Y. 1929) ("[A]nnulment when decreed, puts
an end to it from the beginning."); Gaines v. Jacobsen, 127 N.Y.S.2d 909, 914 (App. Div.
1954) (commenting that an annulment destroys the marriage from the beginning).
170 American Surety Co. v. Conner, 166 N.E. 783, 786 (N.Y. 1929).
171 N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-1.2 (McKinney 2008).
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marriage is annulled by another court. In essence, the Supreme
Court may declare the marriage "no more," but the Surrogate's
Court will simply ignore that declaration. This nonsensical re-
sult makes it clear that: (1) it would have been wise for the
Commission to have invested in a Domestic Relations Law text-
book; and (2) legislative change is necessary to correct the discre-
pancy between these laws.
ii. EPTL § 5-1.2 provides too much protection to the surviving
spouse and too little to the deceased's estate in light of
modern developments.
The Commission's report plainly states that its purpose, with
respect to the laws concerning the spousal right of election, was
to "evaluate the 30 years of experience with the [Decedent Estate
Law] to see whether it [had] effectuated the reform it was de-
signed to make or whether some new method of protecting the
surviving spouse [was] necessary."172 Going into the reform, the
legislature quite obviously did not have the protection of the de-
ceased spouse or his estate in mind. Further, the Commission's
report notes that those responsible for the creation of the elective
share in New York promised that it would "end disinheritance of
the surviving spouse by the deceased."173 What they did not real-
ize was that eliminating spousal disinheritance would come only
at the cost of enabling an unworthy spouse and, in some cases, a
non-spouse, 174 to inherit from the decedent. The legislature's
choice to go to extremes in protecting the surviving spouse has
brought us to the point where, as Justice Holzman aptly noted,
the law is "insufficient to protect estates from unworthy surviv-
ing spouses."1 75
The Commission cannot be faulted for giving so much weight to
the need to protect the surviving spouse. Indeed, before the
enactment of the EPTL, spouses could, and did, evade the laws
aimed at preventing spousal disinheritance by transferring their
assets into non-testamentary forms.176 Many surviving spouses
172 THIRD REPORT, supra note 2, at 191 (emphasis added).
173 Id. at 209 (citing COMBINED REPORTS OF THE DECEDENT ESTATE COMMISSION, Legis.
Doc. No. 70, at 19 (1928)).
174 Such as in the case of a post-mortem annulment.
175 In re Estate of Carmona, 223 N.Y.L.J. 92 (Sur. Ct. 2000).
176 See supra notes 51-64 and accompanying text (detailing instances of spousal disin-
heritance and the principles behind the laws that sought to prevent disinheritance).
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were left with nothing as a result. At the time, the problems fac-
ing the courts today were not as pervasive. However, in the face
of modern problems, the laws must be amended to account for
the results of changing times.
a. Women are no longer necessarily reliant upon their
husbands for financial survival.
While early laws barring spousal disinheritance were designed
to protect women, they are no longer unequivocally the weaker
spouse in a marital relationship. 177 The roles of men and women,
husband and wives, and the family itself have changed dramati-
cally in recent years. 178 Many women manage to work and raise
children on their own, without the assistance of a husband.179 In
other families, both husband and wife have full-time careers and
the responsibilities of child-rearing are assumed, in part, by ex-
tended family or outside help.180 Further still, in some families
the husband assumes the responsibility of rearing the children
and maintaining the home while the wife enjoys a successful ca-
177 See John C. Welsh, 2000-2001 Survey of New York Law: Estates and Trusts, 52
SYRACUSE L. REV. 375, 382 (2002) (explaining that, over time, a surviving spouse has been
awarded increasing protection); see also supra note 19 and accompanying text.
17s See Marion Crain, "Where Have All the Cowboys Gone?" Marriage and Breadwinning
in Postindustrial Society, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1877, 1877 (1999) (emphasizing the dramatic
changes that have occurred in the traditional gender order); see also Ronald Z. Domsky,
'Til Death Do Us Part ... After That, My Dear, You're On Your Own: A Practitioner's
Guide to Disinheriting a Spouse in Illinois, 29 S. ILL. U.L.J. 207, 207 (2005) (noting that
since the 1950's, "there has been unprecedented change, an evolution if you will, in the
American family").
179 See Crain, supra note 178 at 1877-78 (describing that "[tihe traditional male bread-
winner/female homemaker model that once shaped duties and expectations in marriage is
giving way to a model in which men and women function as coequal breadwinners"); see
also Child Trends Data Bank, Family Structure, available at http://www.childtrendsdata
bank.org/indicators/59FamilyStructure.cfm (last visited Mar. 25, 2008) (stating that the
percentage of single mothers has increased from 11 percent to 23 percent from 1970 to
2006).
180 See J. Thomas Oldham, Should the Surviving Spouse's Forced Share Be Retained?,
38 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 223, 236 n.67 (1987). In 1983, in 40.9% of families where the
husband was employed, the wife was also employed. Id.; see U.S. Census Bureau, Percent
of Married-Couple Families with Both Husband and Wife in the Labor Force: 2006, 2006
American Community Survey [hereinafter U.S. Census Bureau], available at
http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/GRTTable?_bm=y&-geo-id=01000US&_box-headnbr
=R2304&-ds name=ACS_2006_ESTGOO_&-redoLog=false&mtname=ACS_2004_EST_
GOR2304_US30&-format=US-30&-CONTEXT=grt. According to the U.S. Census Bu-
reau, in 2006, both husband and wife were in the work force in approximately 53% of all
married couples in the United States. U.S. Census Bureau.
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reer.181 It is no longer the case that a woman cannot provide for
herself and her family in the absence of a man's financial contri-
bution. While most elective share laws are worded in a gender-
neutral manner, they are still based upon the idea that one
spouse provides financially while the other, who cannot survive
without the other, makes the home. Simply put, this is no longer
the case. Accordingly, many of the reasons for having an ironclad
right of election have become irrelevant.
b. The elderly are the new class of "weaker spouse" and the
EPTL should be amended to protect them.
Elder abuse is a relatively new phenomenon.18 2 Today, people
are living longer than ever before, and the elderly often lack the
mental or physical facilities necessary to live on their own.18 3 In
many cases, elderly individuals require the assistance of live-in
nurses or caretakers.18 4 "It is inevitable that the aged and infirm,
under such circumstances, will become very dependent upon
181 See U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment in Married-
Couple Families, Apr. 28, 2006, available at http://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2006/apr/wk4/art
05.html. According to the U.S. Department of Labor, in 2005, in 6.5% of married couples,
the wife was employed while the husband was not. Id.; see Crain, supra note 171, at
1877-78. "Dramatic changes have occurred in the traditional gender order [since 1974.]
One of the most striking is the increased presence of women in the waged labor market."
Crain, supra note 178, at 1877.
182 See generally THE NATIONAL CENTER ON ELDER ABUSE, AMERICAN PUBLIC HUMAN
SERVICES ASSOCIATION & WESTAT, INC., THE NATIONAL ELDER ABUSE INCIDENCE STUDY:
FINAL REPORT 1-2 (1998), www.aoa.gov/eldfam/ElderRights/ElderAbuse/ABuseReport_
Full.pdf (discussing the prevalence of elder abuse in contemporary society). See Korpus,
supra note 1, at 542-43 (emphasizing the prevalence of elder abuse and the need for tools
to fight such abuse).
183 See In re Application for A.S., No. 20493/062007, 2007 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2693, at
*16-*17 (Sup. Ct. Apr. 24, 2007) (emphasizing that an elderly woman, who was incapaci-
tated due to "a progressive and long-term mental disease" and incapable of understanding
"the nature and consequences of marriage," was taken advantage of by her chauffeur, who
fraudulently induced her to entered into marital relationships with him); see also Korpus,
supra note 1, at 543 ('The elderly experience increased vulnerability to abuse from family
members and caretakers as they become frail, dependent, and hampered by loss of physi-
cal and mental faculties.").
184 See Barbara Coleman et al., AARP Public Policy Institute, Long Term Care,
http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenterlhealthfs27r-care.pdf (last visited July 22, 2008). In 1998,
it was estimated that eight million elderly persons required long-term home health care.
It has been projected that by 2018, 9.9 million elderly persons will require long-term care
and, in 2030, 10.8 million elderly persons will require long-term care. Id.; see Jerry Resler,
Better Care for the Aging, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Aug. 28, 2001. Resler stated that
"[o]ver the next 20 years, the projected number of elderly Americans requiring long-term
care is expected to double, to nearly 14 million." Resler, supra note 184.
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those who tend their wants, and a high degree of confidentiality
will develop under which the aged will reveal to them their clos-
est thoughts and the state of their financial affairs."'185 This
makes the elderly vulnerable, and puts caretakers in a prime po-
sition to exploit and deceive. 8 6 As we have seen, some caretakers
have done just that.
While any caretaker who marries his or her incapacitated ward
must fear that the ward's family or friends will seek to annul the
marriage, this fear is largely extinguished at the death of the
ward. Although an action for annulment after the ward's death
may result in extinguishment of the marriage itself, it will not
extinguish the caretaker's ability to lay claim to one-third of the
decedent's estate. 8 7 This results in a dramatic role-reversal -
now, the prevailing concern is not that the surviving spouse will
be left penniless, but that the surviving spouse will deprive the
decedent's other heirs of that which is rightfully theirs. In short,
a surviving spouse in these circumstances may be unjustly
enriched simply by squirming through a loophole in the EPTL.s88
c. There is no longer a stigma associated with terminating a
marriage, and people frequently end their
marriages, at law and in fact, without hesitation.
Another significant societal change is the increasing preva-
lence of divorce. 8 9 In considering the right of election, the legisla-
185 In re Estate of Burke, 441 N.Y.S.2d 542, 549 (App. Div. 1981).
186 Korpus, supra note 1, at 544 (explaining that, as the elderly get older, they become
more likely to be emotionally, physically, or financially abused); see Gina Salamone, Se-
crets & Lies: The case of Brooke Astor highlights concerns of Elder Abuse in the City, N.Y.
DAILY NEWS, July 30, 2006 (reporting that the elderly are commonly subjected to psycho-
logical and emotional abuse "but it's usually associated with another type of abuse.").
187 See generally N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-1.2 (McKinney 2008) (providing
that a spouse may only be disqualified on the basis of divorce, annulment, dissolution or
separation where a decree was in effect on decedent's date of death); Bennett v. Thomas,
327 N.Y.S.2d 139, 140 (App. Div. 1971) (stating that the husband is a surviving spouse for
election purposes unless an annulment was in effect when the deceased spouse died).
188 See THIRD REPORT, supra note 2, at 209 (noting that, even at the time of the Com-
mission's report in 1964, critics of the right of election had suggested that the right does
not protect the surviving spouse, but "enriches her at the expense of others dependent on
the testator's bounty"); see also supra, note 15 and accompanying text.
189 See Oldham, supra note 180, at 236 (asserting that recent social changes, such as
the acceptance of divorce at will by most states, have significantly altered the institution
of marriage); see also Glenn T. Stanton, Fact Sheet on Divorce in America, Smartmarriag-
es.com, http://www.smartmarriages.com/divorce_brief.html (last visited Aug. 11, 2008)
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tive history to the EPTL noted that "[i]n the vast majority of cas-
es, there is not family disharmony, at least during the decedent's
lifetime." 190 At present, however, it is the unfortunate truth that
family disharmony is common. 191 Though statistics vary, most
sources estimate that approximately 40% to 50% of marriages
will end in divorce. 192 In contrast, the incidence of divorce in 1960
was about half of what it is today.193 These figures do not account
for the very real problem posed by the number of couples who
parted ways without obtaining a legal divorce, separation, or an-
nulment.
The legislature flirted with the idea of addressing the non-
judicial divorce in 1992, when it amended various provisions of
the EPTL based upon six reports containing the findings and rec-
ommendations of the EPTL-SCPA Legislative Advisory Commit-
tee (hereinafter "Advisory Committee").1 94  The first report
(noting that the "number [ofl currently divorced adults quadrupled from 4.3 million in
1970 to 17.4 million in 1994").
190 THIRD REPORT, supra note 2, at 213.
191 See First Report of the Advisory Committee, supra note 5, app. 1.04[2] (explaining
that "the destabilization of marriage" has become prevalent in recent years, and that
there has been a "tremendous increase in divorce"); see also Stanton, supra note 182 (hig-
hlighting that the "fastest growing marital status category was divorced persons").
192 See Glenn T. Stanton, Do Half of All American Marriages Really End in Divorce?,
Family.org, http://www.family.org/socialissues/AO00000596.cfm#footnoteRef4 (last visited
July 22, 2008) (asserting that marriages formed today have between 41-43% probability
of ending in divorce); see also Barbara DaFoe Whitehead & David Popenoe, The State of
Our Unions: 2004, The Social Health of Marriage in America, The National Marriage
Project, June 2004, available at http://marriage.rutgers.eduPublications/Print/PrintSOO
U2004.htm (stating that, for couples marrying in recent years, the lifetime probability of
divorce is close to 50%).
193 See William A. Galston, Divorce American style, BNET: PUBLIC INTEREST, Summer
1996, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi-m0377/is_n124/ai_18579233 (noting that in
1960 only sixteen percent of marriages ended in divorce compared to 40 percent today);
see also Whitehead & Popenoe, supra note 192 (stating that the divorce rate in 1960 was
approximately half of what it is today).
194 See generally First Report of the Advisory Committee, supra note 5, app. 1.01 (sub-
mitting the "first report covering the progress of the Committee's work from May 15, 1990
through March 18, 1991); Second Report of the EPTL-SCPA Advisory Committee, in 13-2
WARREN'S HEATON ON SURROGATE'S COURT PRACTICE app. 2.01 (2007) [hereinafter
Second Report of the Advisory Committee] (updating the work of the expanded Advisory
Committee); Third Report of the EPTL-SCPA Advisory Committee, in 13-3 WARREN'S
HEATON ON SURROGATE'S COURT PRACTICE app. 3.01 (2007) [hereinafter Third Report of
Advisory Committee] (recommending "that the New York State Legislature enact a New
York Prudent Investor Act (NYPIA)"); Fourth Report of the EPTL-SCPA Advisory Com-
mittee, in 13-4 WARREN'S HEATON ON SURROGATE'S COURT PRACTICE app. 4.01 (2007) (he-
reinafter Fourth Report of Advisory Committee) (recommending "that New York adopt leg-
islation governing substantive and procedural aspects of lifetime trusts"); Fifth Report of
the EPTL-SCPA Advisory Committee, in 13-5 WARREN'S HEATON ON SURROGATE'S COURT
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pointed out that, in these cases, "[i]t is frequently impossible [for
a decedent's estate] to establish abandonment with competent
and adequate proof, in part because of evidentiary prohibi-
tions."195 To ease this burden, the Advisory Committee recom-
mended that the burden of proof shift to the surviving spouse to
disprove abandonment where "the spouses [lived] separate and
apart for a continuous period of five years, up to and including
the time of death of the deceased spouse, and ... neither spouse
received support from the other."' 96 Further, the Advisory Com-
mittee noted that whether either spouse consented to the aban-
donment should be irrelevant.' 97 The proposed law, which was to
be embodied in EPTL § 5-1.2(b), stated that:
[i]n any action or proceeding in which any party seeks to
disqualify the spouse under subparagraph (a)(5) of this
section, the burden of establishing to the court having ju-
risdiction that the spouse abandoned the deceased spouse,
and that such abandonment continued until the time of
death, shall be upon the party seeking to disqualify the
spouse, except however, that if the spouse and the de-
ceased spouse had lived separate and apart for a conti-
nuous period of at least five years, and such separation
continued until the time of death of the deceased spouse,
during which time neither spouse received support from
the other, the surviving spouse shall have the burden of
proving absence of abandonment on the part of the surviv-
ing spouse. 198
Despite the Advisory Committee's recognition of this ongoing
problem, EPTL § 5-1.2(b) was never enacted' 99 and the statute is
PRACTICE app. 5.01 (2007) (hereinafter Fifth Report of the Advisory Committee) (recom-
mending "that the New York State Legislature enact additions to Article 11 of the Es-
tates, Powers and Trusts Law to make changes in the definition of trust accounting in-
come); Unnumbered Report of the EPTL-SCPA Advisory Committee, in 13-6 WARREN'S
HEATON ON SURROGATE'S COURT PRACTICE App. 6.01 (2007) [hereinafter Unnumbered Re-
port of the Advisory Committee] (proposing "amendments to the SCPA and EPTL"). See
First Report of the Advisory Committee, supra note 5, app. 1.01, at Q (discussing the sce-
nario described by the author as a "non-judicial divorce").
195 See First Report of the Advisory Committee, supra note 5, App. 1.01, at Q (discussing
the scenario described by the author as a "non-judicial divorce").
196 Id.
197 Id. (stating that "[s]pousal consent or non-consent to the abandonment would not be
an issue").
198 Id.
199 The proposed addition of sub-section (b) remains absent from EPTL § 5-1.2. Compare
First Report of the Advisory Committee, supra note 5, app. 1.01, at Q (containing the pro-
2008]
ST JOHN'S JO URNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY
the same today as it was in 1965 - centered on protected the sur-
viving spouse rather than the decedent's estate.
B. Proposed Amendments to EPTL § 5-1.2
There are several ways that EPTL § 5-1.2 might be amended to
remedy the aforementioned problems, thereby providing ade-
quate protection for both the surviving spouse and the deceased
spouse's estate. First, the legislature should harmonize the dis-
qualification provisions of the EPTL with the provisions govern-
ing the annulment of voidable marriages under the DRL.
Second, the legislature should disqualify the surviving spouse
where a marriage was effectively ended by a non-judicial divorce.
Finally, the legislature should enact a "catch-all provision" that
permits Surrogates to disqualify a surviving spouse when it is in
the interest of justice and fairness to do so.
i. Consistency Between the EPTL and DRL
The EPTL should not be permitted to counteract the DRL by
providing that, in effect, a nullified marriage still somehow exists
as a source of rights when brought behind the doors of the Surro-
gate's Court. Accordingly, EPTL § 5-1.2 should be amended to
provide that a decree of annulment disqualifies a surviving
spouse, even where it is procured after the death of the deceased
spouse pursuant to the DRL. This amendment would remedy the
inequitable results discussed above in the case of marriages re-
sulting from elder abuse and sham marriages.
However, the amendments should be tailored to ensure the ex-
pedient and final disposition of all actions. This concern arises
because the DRL permits a post mortem annulment during the
remaining spouse's life, potentially even years after the dece-
dent's death. 200 If a decedent's estate is settled, all assets having
posed language for EPTL § 5-1.2), with N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-1.2 (McKin-
ney 2008) (failing to incorporated that proposed language).200 See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 140(c) (McKinney 2008) (An action to annul a marriage on
the ground that one of the parties thereto was a mentally ill person may be maintained at
any time during the continuance of the mental illness, or, after the death of the mentally
ill person in that condition, and during the life of the other party to the marriage, by any
relative of the mentally ill person who has an interest to avoid the marriage."); see also id.
§ 140(e) ("Any such action may also be maintained during the life-time of the other party
by the parent, or the guardian of the person of the party whose consent was so obtained,
or by any relative of that party who has an interest to avoid the marriage, provided that
[Vol. 23:3
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been distributed, an annulment obtained thereafter should not
require the surviving spouse to reimburse the estate. This could
lead to protracted legal battles long after a decedent's death, and
in circumstances in which the surviving spouse is financially un-
able to reimburse the estate. Anyone interested in nullifying the
marriage, therefore, must do so before, or concurrently with the
probate of the estate. The probate proceedings should be stayed
pending the outcome of the annulment proceedings when neces-
sary. But, after an estate is settled, the interests of judicial
economy require that the issue of spousal disqualification be laid
to rest once and for all.
Critics may suggest that it is actually in the interest of judicial
economy to prevent more posthumous matrimonial trials, which
will likely result from a change in the EPTL's disqualification
provisions. In its report, the Commission lamented the difficulty
of such trials, describing the Surrogate's task as "onerous" be-
cause "one party is unable to testify by reason of death, and the
other is rendered an incompetent witness because of the inhibi-
tion.., against testimony by a survivor respecting personal
transactions with a decedent." 20 1 However, no matter how oner-
ous these trials may be, the Domestic Relations Law explicitly
authorizes these actions. The members of the judiciary, there-
fore, must hear such cases and dispose of them to the best of
their ability notwithstanding their "onerous" nature.
ii. Disqualification in the Event of Non-Judicial Divorce
EPTL § 5-1.2 should be amended to provide for disqualification
of a surviving spouse where, during the lifetime of the decedent
spouse, the couple: (1) agreed to part ways, or where one party
did not object to the departure of the other; (2) physically sepa-
rated and lived apart; (3) divided or disposed of all jointly owned
property and assets; and (4) maintained complete financial inde-
pendence of one another. All of these requirements must be sa-
tisfied both continuously and simultaneously for a minimum of
in an action to annul a marriage on the ground of fraud the limitation prescribed in the
civil practice law and rules has not run.") (emphasis added); see N.Y. C.P.L.R. 213(8)
(McKinney 2008) ("[A]n action based upon fraud; the time within which the action must
be commenced shall be the greater of six years from the date the cause of action accrued
or two years from the time the plaintiff or the person under whom the plaintiff claims dis-
covered the fraud, or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it.").
201 FOURTH REPORT, supra note 25, at 279.
20081
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three years at the time of decedent's death. These conditions are
rigid enough to ensure that a spouse can only be disqualified
where no marriage existed in fact despite its existence at law. In
addition, the minimum time period makes certain that the sepa-
ration was more than likely to be permanent and that reconcilia-
tion would have been highly improbable had the decedent lived
beyond his date of death.
Disqualifying a surviving spouse in the case of a non-judicial
divorce is supported by public policy, because the policy reasons
for barring spousal disinheritance are inapplicable. One such
reason is to protect the surviving spouse from being unable to
sustain herself in the wake of the decent spouse's death.20 2 That
concern is irrelevant in the case of non-judicial divorce because
the parties no longer provide financial support to one another.
They maintain separate finances and lead monetarily separate
existences, and must have done so for several years to result in
disqualification. Therefore, the death of one spouse does not
render the other financially unable to survive.
A second policy reason for the bar to spousal disinheritance is
that spouses are entitled to share in each other's estates because
of the "contribution" that each spouse makes to the other's life.20 3
However, the spouses of a non-judicial divorce make no such con-
tribution to each other's lives. They live apart over a period of
multiple years. In reality, they have no relationship, much less
the relationship of a married couple. Therefore, neither one has
any moral entitlement to a share in the other's estate.
Critics may argue that such entitlement exists as a result of
contributions made during the period in which the parties lived
together as a married couple. However, the non-judicial divorce
involves the consent, either affirmative or passive, of both parties
to end their relationship. This consent effectively constitutes a
waiver by each party of the right to share in the other's estate,
because neither party has any reason to expect that he should
inherit from a person with whom he has no relationship. 20 4 And,
202 See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
203 See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
204 See In re Estate of Carmona, 223 N.Y.L.J. 92 (Sur. Ct. 2000) ("[The provisions of
EPTL § 5-1.2 are insufficient to protect a decedent's estate and therefore cause results
that are] contrary to the wishes of the decedent and benefit a survivor who had no right to
expect to receive anything of pecuniary value from the decedent while she was alive.
Those who are willing to live apart from their spouses for many years, and who have not
[Vol. 23:3
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if one of the parties were to depart without the consent of the
other, the facts would no longer support a finding of a non-
judicial divorce. In that case, the DRL provisions concerning
spousal abandonment would govern. 20 5
iii. Catch-All Provision
Recognizing that unforeseeable situations might arise, the leg-
islature has often included a "catch-all" provision in statutes. 20 6
These provisions provide courts with the ability to bring a certain
act within the purview of a statute when it is fair or just to do so,
notwithstanding that the statute does explicitly cover that act.
Adding a catch-all provision to EPTL § 5-1.2 would permit Sur-
rogates, like Sobel and Holzman, to disqualify a spouse in the in-
terests of justice. Because the right of election concerns spousal
and familial relationships, which evolve over time, a catch-all
provision would also permit Surrogates to exercise their judg-
ment in the absence of legislation that is updated every time the
social climate changes. Such a provision might read: "A husband
or wife is a surviving spouse unless it is established that the
in any way been dependent upon their spouses while they have been separated, should
also be obliged to stay away from their spouses' property after death unless there is a will
which provides to the contrary."); see also In re Estate of Lamos, 313 N.Y.S.2d 781, 785
(Sur. Ct. 1970) (stating that § 5-1.2 of the EPTL is insufficient to protect estates from un-
worthy surviving spouses leading to frequent "unjust and often even unconscionable" re-
sults).
205 See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 170 (2) (McKinney 2008). The Domestic Relations Law de-
fines abandonment as a voluntary, unjustified departure from the marital residence by
one spouse, who has no intention of returning, without the consent and against the will of
the other for a minimum of one year. Id.; see Wu v. Wu, 661 N.Y.S.2d 918, 919 (Sup. Ct.
1997).
206 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 213(1) (McKinney 2008) (declaring that "[t]he following actions
must be commenced within six years: 1. an action for which no limitation is specifically
prescribed by law"); see also N.Y. CRIM. PRO. LAW § 60.42(5) (McKinney 2008) (providing
that "[e]vidence of a victim's sexual conduct shall not be admissible in a prosecution for an
offense or an attempt to commit an offense defined in article one hundred thirty of the
penal law unless such evidence: . . . 5. is determined by the court after an offer of proof by
the accused outside the hearing of the jury, or such hearing as the court may require, and
a statement by the court of its findings of fact essential to its determination, to be rele-
vant and admissible in the interests of justice") (emphasis added); see also N.Y. DOM. REL.
LAW § 236(B)(5)(d) (McKinney 2008) (stating that "[iun determining an equitable disposi-
tion of property ... the court shall consider: ... (13) any other factor which the court shall
expressly find to be just and proper"); see also N.Y. S.C.P.A. § 707(1)(e) (McKinney 2008)
(proscribing that "[1]etters may issue to a natural person or to a person authorized by law
to be a fiduciary except . . . (e) one who does not possess the qualifications required of a
fiduciary by reason of substance abuse, dishonesty, improvidence, want of understanding,
or who is otherwise unfit for the execution of the office") (emphasis added).
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classification of the husband or wife as a 'surviving spouse' would
result in a miscarriage of justice."
Critics may argue that a catch-all provision would "open the
floodgates" of litigation and negate years of attempting to ade-
quately protect surviving spouses. However, all Surrogates
should be charged with understanding the historical background
of the bar to spousal disinheritance and the grounds for spousal
disqualification, and should therefore recognize that the catch-all
provision would apply only if extreme injustice would otherwise
result. Whether courts would employ the provision too liberally
is something that only practice will reveal. A clear legislative
history to the provision would be a safeguard against abuse and
would provide appellate courts with a guide for overturning lower
court decisions outside the intended scope of the catch-all.
IV. A TEMPORARY SOLUTION FOR OUR SURROGATES: A BLEND OF
COURAGE AND EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL
A. Overview of Equitable Estoppel and Its Role in Surrogate's
Court
In the absence of further legislation, Surrogates in New York
should turn to the doctrine of equitable estoppel in order to
achieve just results in some of these cases. "The purpose of
equitable estoppel is to preclude a person from asserting a right
[when he or she] has led another to form the reasonable belief
that the right would not be asserted, and loss or prejudice to the
other would result if the right were asserted. '20 7 Courts invoke
the doctrine "as a matter of fairness."208 Equitable estoppel "may
and has been applied in statutory proceedings by courts of li-
mited jurisdiction." 20 9 Accordingly, a Surrogate's Court can em-
ploy the doctrine despite the fact that the proceeding before it
207 Shondel J. v. Mark D., 853 N.E.2d 610, 613 (N.Y. 2006).
208 Id.; accord Charles v. Charles, 745 N.Y.S.2d 572, 575 (App. Div. 2002) (explaining that
"estoppels are equitable doctrines used to promote fairness and justice').
209 In re Baby Boy C., 638 N.E.2d 963, 967 (N.Y. 1994); see In re Estate of Orejas, No.
229-P/03, 2006 WL 1707950, at *3-*4 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. June 22, 2006) (applying doctrine of
equitable estoppel to bar executor from asserting statute of limitations defense against
surviving spouse's elective share because executor had concealed from the spouse fact that
there was a will to which she could object).
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may be governed by the EPTL.210
B. Elements of Proof in an Equitable Estoppel Claim
In.order to equitably estop a party from asserting a particular
right or claim, the party arguing for estoppel must prove three
elements: (1) conduct by the party to be estopped which amounts
to a misrepresentation or concealment of material facts or, at
least, which was calculated to convey the impression that the
facts are otherwise and inconsistent with those which the party
subsequently seeks to assert; (2) the party to be estopped in-
tended that the other party would act upon this conduct; and (3)
the party to be estopped had actual or constructive knowledge of
the real facts. 211 Additionally, the party asserting estoppel must
further prove that he: (1) lacked knowledge and the means of
knowledge of the truth as to the facts in question; (2) acted in
good faith; (3) relied on the words or conduct of the party to be
estopped; and (4) experienced a prejudicial change in his or her
position in a material way. 212
210 See Baby Boy, 638 N.E.2d at 967 (employing the doctrine of equitable estoppel); see
also Orejas, 2006 WL 1707950, at *3-*4 (invoking equitable estoppel).
211 See Werking v. Amity Estates, Inc., 137 N.E.2d 321, 327 (N.Y. 1956) (declaring that
"'to constitute estoppel, 'the person sought to be estopped must do some act or make some
admission with an intention of influencing the conduct of another and which act or admis-
sion is inconsistent with the claim he proposes now to make"' (quoting New York Rubber
Co. v. Rothery, 14 N.E. 269, 271 (N.Y. 1887))); see also Benincasa v. Garrubbo, 529
N.Y.S.2d 797, 800 (App. Div. 1988) (stating that the essential elements for equitable es-
toppel are "(1) conduct which amounts to a false representation or concealment of materi-
al facts, (2) intention that such conduct will be acted upon by the other party, and (3)
knowledge of the true facts,"); In re Estate of Carr, 473 N.Y.S.2d 179, 182 (App. Div. 1984)
(asserting that the three necessary elements for estoppel are '(1) Conduct which amounts
to a false representation or concealment of material facts, or, at least, which is calculated
to convey the impression that the facts are otherwise than and inconsistent with, those
which the party subsequently seeks to assert; (2) intention, or at least expectation, that
such conduct will be acted upon by the other party; (3) and, in some situations, know-
ledge, actual or constructive, of the real facts"' (quoting 21 N.Y. JUR. 2D ESTOPPEL § 21
(2008)).
212 Walls v. Levin, 540 N.Y.S.2d 623, 625 (N.Y. 1989) (detailing that "[tihe party assert-
ing estoppel must show with respect to himself: (1) lack of knowledge of the true facts; (2)
reliance upon the conduct of the party estopped; and (3) a prejudicial change in his posi-
tion" (citing Airco Alloys Div. v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 430 N.Y.S.2d 179, 187
(App. Div. 1980))); Holm v. CMP Sheet Metal, 455 N.Y.S.2d 429, 433 (App. Div. 1982)
(declaring that New York requires that "the party asserting estoppel [prove] (1) lack of
knowledge of the true facts; (2) good faith reliance; and (3) a change of position" (citing 21
N.Y. JUR. 2D ESTOPPEL § 21 (2008)).
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C. Equitable Estoppel Applied in the Case of Spousal
Disqualification
A review of case law reveals that equitable estoppel has not
been frequently applied in disputes concerning spousal disquali-
fication. However, in at least one case, a Surrogate has employed
the doctrine.
In In re Mattox, the court applied the doctrine of equitable es-
toppel in order to bar a woman from exercising her right of elec-
tion where she had misled the decedent to believe she had ob-
tained an ex parte divorce from him. 213 Based on this
misrepresentation, the decedent allegedly married another wom-
an at common law and in a religious ceremony. 214 Upon his
death, the decedent's first wife attempted to elect against his
will, revealing for the first time that she had never obtained a di-
vorce and that, therefore, the decedent's second marriage was
void as bigamous. 21 5 EPTL § 5-1.2(a)(2) provides that a spouse in
a bigamous marriage is disqualified from exercising her right of
election.2 16 Accordingly, the decedent's first wife moved for sum-
mary judgment, arguing that the plain language of the EPTL
compelled a finding that the decedent's second wife was disquali-
fied, leaving his first wife free to elect to the decedent's will.217
However, the decedent's second wife argued that the decedent's
first wife must be equitably estopped because the decedent had
relied on her intentional misstatement.218 The court agreed with
the decedent's second wife, holding that the doctrine of equitable
estoppel could be invoked in these circumstances and that a trial
on that issue was necessary.219
D. How Equitable Estoppel Could Be Applied to Avoid the Kinds
of Injustice Discussed Above
Equitable estoppel does not lend itself to instances of non-
213 In re Estate of Mattox, 226 N.Y.L.J. 57 (Sur. Ct. 2001).
214 Id.
215 Id.
216 Id. (declaring that "any alleged marriage between the decedent and the respondent
was void as bigamous"); see N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-1.2 (McKinney 2008)
(establishing that a husband or wife is a spouse within statutory meaning "unless it is
established ... [that] [tihe marriage was void ... as bigamous").
217 Id.
218 Id.
219 Id.
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judicial divorce because the surviving spouse in those cases did
not misrepresent or conceal material facts. However, equitable
estoppel should be employed in cases like In re Application of
Wang. In such instances, a caretaker is a party to the marriage
but conceals it or fails to disclose its existence in order to prevent
family members from seeking an annulment. Further, the dece-
dent's family does not know of the marriage during the dece-
dent's lifetime. The decedent's family relies on the caretaker's si-
lence with respect to the existence of a marriage in not taking
action to terminate it. Finally, the family experiences a detri-
mental and material change in position insofar as their shares of
the decedent's estate will be reduced if the caretaker-widow is
able to exercise her right of election.
While it is theoretically possible for a decedent's family to pre-
vail on an equitable estoppel claim, Surrogate Johnson expressly
rejected this argument in In re Application of Wang.220 The dece-
dent's sons argued that Wang stood in a fiduciary relationship to
their father because he was vulnerable as a result of his infirmity
and she was his caretaker. 221 Further, they claimed that Wang
breached her fiduciary duty by failing to disclose the marriage to
them during their father's life. 222 The Court declined to invoke
equitable estoppel on the grounds that Berk's sons had not cited
any case law in which the doctrine had been employed in similar
circumstances. 223 This reason for not estopping Wang is unsound,
as the derth of case law on the issue should not prevent the court
from applying equitable estoppel. The doctrine is meant to be ap-
plied on a case-by-case basis, and the fact that an issue is one of
first impression should not render an equitable estoppel argu-
ment untenable.
Ultimately, even in the face of In re Application of Wang, Sur-
rogates presiding in these cases should estop an unworthy spouse
because equitable principles permit them to do so, because justice
dictates that they should, and because it will send a message to
the legislature that a literal application of the statute does not
adequately guard against potential injustice.
220 In re Application of Wang, No. 2488/2006, 2008 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4031 (Sur. Ct. Ju-
ly 3, 2008).
221 Id. at *8.
222 Id.
223 Id. at *9.
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CONCLUSION
The bar to spousal disinheritance is age-old and deeply en-
grained in our laws. Though this might make it difficult to move
away from the historical view that a surviving spouse is entitled
to nearly absolute protection, it is nonetheless time to move in
that direction. The injustices that have befallen the relatives of
some decedents are unacceptable. A call for legislative action has
been mounting, and will continue to do so, as further cases that
illustrate the inadequacy of EPTL § 5-1.2 make their way
through the New York courts.
